HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
REVIEW OF CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S PERFORMANCE IN AFRICA

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(III)
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:42 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (chair of the subcommittee) presiding.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will now come to order.

Today's hearing, barring an unforeseen post-election session, will bring to a conclusion the subcommittee’s formal work for the 104th Congress.

It is an appropriate moment to step back from the canvass and take a look at the overall picture of American foreign policy in Africa.

The Clinton administration has proposed various foreign policy doctrines to guide American actions in the post-cold war era. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, in September 1993, proposed a “strategy of enlargement, the enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.”

U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright has proposed a strategy of “assertive multilateralism”, in which multinational organizations, such as the United Nations, would become the leaders in the solution of the world’s problems.

As the Administration has engaged in what appears to be an internal debate, still unresolved, about the underlying principles of American foreign policy, many observers have noted that the chronic problems in Africa appear to have faded from the Administration’s agenda.

They note the relative lack of high-level, sustained interest in solving the chronic problems in Africa that are posed by failed states and by states in crisis.

In Somalia, the Clinton administration’s goal of nation-building was quickly abandoned at the end of 1993 after far too many American soldiers were called upon to give their lives in support of that policy.

Some observers believe that the Clinton administration decided after the debacle of its policy in Somalia to adopt a minimalistic posture with respect to various crises in Africa.

Some 200,000 people, out of a population of only two and a half million, have perished in the civil war in Liberia. U.S. involvement in the search for a solution to that civil war and for a restoration
of decency in Liberia appears inadequate to the human tragedy that has taken place there.

In Rwanda, in 1994, an estimated half a million to a million were killed in a coordinated, country-wide series of massacres. Again, that policy of minimalism appears to have been adopted in response to an unthinkable level of destruction of human lives.

In Burundi, in 1993, another 100,000 are believed to have been killed; and the weekly death toll continues to mount.

Slavery in Sudan and Mauritania continues to offend the minimum standards of human rights. Human rights abuses and the denial of democratic rights continue in many countries throughout the continent.

In the area of economic development and progress, Africa appears to have been left behind in the global economy. More needs to be done to help Africans become more productive and competitive in the world economy and to participate in the massive expansion of international trade.

The policy of promoting human rights and democracy, which has been claimed as one of the principles of the Clinton foreign policy, appears to be less vigorously pursued in Africa than in other regions of the world. Almost all observers have noted that our vigorous policy under the Bush administration of promoting democracy and political rights in Kenya, for example, has given way to a policy which is much less vigorous or assertive.

The challenges we face in Africa are difficult. Those who have dealt with these problems in the past and who have had the responsibility for seeking solutions must have some sympathy for the task facing those who deal with these challenges every day.

Our witnesses here today have much experience in coping with these challenges in Africa.

And we would like to welcome, to make any opening statements they might wish to make, Congressman Harry Johnston who just returned from a trip to Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, and South Sudan. He has been an extremely active member of our subcommittee, the former chairman of this subcommittee and a recognized expert in all areas dealing with Africa.

Welcome, Harry, always.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I was just thinking back 4 years ago when I became chair of this committee, I had been to Africa one time for 2 days; and thinking of the commitment that you have made to this continent for the last 2 years, the hearings that you have had. I know that those of us here who are devoted to Africa and the Africanists in this room appreciate your work.

I will not go through and try to rebut all of your opening statement. You criticized the present Administration for non-intervention in such places as Liberia, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Burundi. I would imagine that we would not get many votes out of the Republican Party to engage in these countries during the last 2 years.

So just that simple observation, Madam Chair.

I would probably like to wait until these four distinguished witnesses testify and then go into questions then.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Johnston.

Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. I will be very brief.

I would just, first of all, since we are almost finished with this session of Congress, personally thank and commend the Chair, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, for the tremendous leadership she has shown in chairing this committee and the many interesting hearings that we have had and the things that I have personally learned and hope to be on this committee for some time to come.

And I want to thank her for holding this hearing today. And we appreciate the gentlemen on the panel.

Thank you very much.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Steve.

Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Ms. Chairlady. Let me also congratulate you for calling this very important hearing. And perhaps this may be one of our last hearings to compliment you on having run a very efficient committee and giving us opportunities to discuss policy toward Africa.

I would just like to mention that the Congressional Black Caucus hosted a brain trust, as we do, at our annual legislative conference a week or so ago; and we had a very good discussion around the issue, and the whole topic for 4 hours dealt with the conflict resolution in Africa and putting diplomacy in action.

All in all, it was a very interesting discussion. People joining us at that particular hearing were Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali of the UN; Howard Wolpe, the Special Envoy to Burundi; Susan Rice, from the National Security Council; Ellen Johnson Sirleaf from the United Nations; Kofi Annan, who is second in command of peacekeeping; former Undersecretary Cohen; and many others joined the panel.

Also I had the opportunity to visit with the President and Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali at the United Nations earlier this week. And it was very important, I think, that the President promised to have the dues of the United States brought up to date and that Congress would give more attention to Africa. So I was very pleased to hear that.

In light of this, I understand that Mr. Christopher is planning a trip to Sub-Saharan Africa, our Secretary of State. Although I have not spoken to Secretary Christopher as to the purposes and the goals of this hearing of his trip, I hope that it will bring back some very productive fruits.

I also would like to mention that today, with members of the Ways and Means Committee, legislation was introduced that—Representative Crane and Representative McDermott, and Representative Rangel—would help to spur trade with Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular.

So I would just like to say that there are still many problems, as we know, and Nigeria and Sudan and Liberia; but there are many successes also that we see elections and democratization going on.

And I also would like to commend Representative Johnston for his recent trip, and I am looking forward to hearing from him as to his findings.

So let me just, once again, compliment you for calling this very important hearing.
Thank you.

Ms. Ros-Lèhtinen. Thank you so much, Congress Payne. Thank you for your participation in all of our subcommittee hearings. Thank you.

Now, I would like to introduce the witnesses who will be testifying today.

First we will hear from Smith Hempstone, who served as the ambassador to Kenya from December 1989 to February 1993 where he was intimately involved in bringing multi-party democracy to that East African Republic.

An honors graduate of the University of the South in Tennessee, Ambassador Hempstone fought as a Marine officer in Korea and has written for the Associated Press, the Louisville Times, and the National Geographic Magazine.

He has also served as a foreign correspondent of the Chicago Daily News and the Washington Star and as executive editor and editor-in-chief of the Washington Times.

Ambassador Hempstone has taught at the University of the South and at the Virginia Military Institute as a diplomat in residence. He has authored numerous articles and several books and has been recognized throughout the years for his contributions and service.

Welcome, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Hempstone will be followed by Dr. Chester Crocker who is the Landegger Distinguished Research Professor of Diplomacy at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

From 1981 to 1989, Dr. Crocker served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, where, among other accomplishments, he developed the strategy and led the diplomatic efforts that produced the treaty signed by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa in New York in December 1988. These agreements resulted in Namibia’s independence and the withdrawal of foreign forces from that area and from Angola.

Dr. Crocker’s previous professional experience includes service as a news editor of Africa Report magazine, as staff officer at the National Security Council, and as director of the Master of Science and Foreign Service program and associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University.

Dr. Crocker serves as chairman of the board of the U.S. Institute of Peace and serves on the boards of the Central Africa Foundation and the Corporate Council on Africa, among others.

He has lectured and written extensively on international politics, U.S. foreign policy, mediation and conflict resolution, African affairs, and post-cold war security issues.

Welcome, Dr. Crocker.

Next, we will hear from an old friend of the subcommittee and the full Committee on International Relations, Dr. David Gordon, who is Director of the U.S. Policy Program at the Overseas Development Council.

Until November, he was a senior Democratic professional staff member of the Committee on International Relations, responsible for advising the ranking member, Lee Hamilton, and other Democratic members on foreign aid, international finance, and African affairs.
Previously, Dr. Gordon has served as senior political economist for Abt Associates and as the regional economic policy and governance advisor for eastern and southern Africa for the U.S. Agency for International Development based in Nairobi, Kenya.

He has taught at the College of William and Mary, the University of Michigan, the University of Nairobi, Boston University, and Michigan State University.

Dr. Gordon is the author of several books and numerous articles on international relations and economic development issues, primarily in Africa.

Welcome, Dr. Gordon.

And our final presentation will be made by Mr. Kansteiner, who is a senior fellow at the Forum for International Policy.

Mr. Kansteiner served as the director of African Affairs at the National Security Council where, among other issues, he was involved in the Angolan and Somali negotiations.

He also served as Deputy White House Press Secretary where he was the primary spokesman for foreign affairs. Prior to his tenure at the White House, he served on the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff and on a strategic minerals task force at the Department of Defense.

Before his government service, he was executive vice president of a commodity trading and manufacturing company. And he, too, has been widely published.

We thank all of our witnesses for being here today and for sharing their views with us. We will begin with Ambassador Hempstone. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF SMITH HEMPSTONE, FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO KENYA

Mr. Hempstone. Thank you, Madam Chair.

It is a privilege and an honor to be asked to testify here today on the state of human rights and the expansion of democracy in Africa.

I think the policy of the Bush administration was quite clear in that respect in that in late 1989, early 1990, both President Bush and Secretary Baker made public statements to the effect that the United States would give its most generous support for those African nations that honored human rights, lived by the rule of law, and expanded democracy.

These statements were followed in Christmas of 1989 by a telegram from the American ambassador to Tanzania, Donald Patterson, to Hank Cohen, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in which Ambassador Patterson advocated that the United States make it clear to the African states that we would do just that.

Mr. Cohen circulated this telegram with his strong endorsement to all ambassadors, all American ambassadors serving in Africa. Now to those who might not have gotten the point, Cohen then called a conference of all American ambassadors serving in Africa in March 1990, which took place in Washington. And at that conference, Cohen made it clear that, indeed, this would be our policy.

Now, I would not maintain that all 40-career ambassadors or the four of us who were political appointees returned consumed with
passion to expand democracy in Africa. But certainly it was not the fault of the White House or the State Department, because they had certainly laid out the plan.

Madam Chair, you have been kind to mention my involvement in the advancement of democracy in Kenya, and I will not refer to that in my oral statement here. I have covered it in the written statement. So let me just start, more or less with the end of my time in Kenya.

Moi finally agreed to hold multi-party elections on December 29, 1992. Although everything possible was done to rig those elections, the opposition won 70 percent of the parliamentary vote, which translated into 88 seats out of 188; and it won 64 percent of the Presidential vote; although Mr. Moi was reelected with 36 percent because the vote was divided between three candidates.

Now, Mr. Bush had been defeated for reelection 8 weeks before Kenyans went to the polls. My disappointment at Mr. Bush's failure to win a second term, which meant my leaving my job in Kenya half done, was somewhat lessened by the not unreasonable assumption that a Democratic President would, if anything, take a harder line on African policy. Support for human rights, the rule of law, and the expansion of democracy were, after all, Jeffersonian and Wilsonian principles.

Unfortunately, this proved not to be the case. President Bill Clinton has not, to my knowledge, backed away from the application of those principles in Africa. He has simply failed to press his ambassadors and other State Department bureaucrats to pursue such policies.

Indeed, one is led to wonder whether the Administration has an African policy. Hand-wringing over dead babies in Burundi does not add up to one.

Kenya is a case in point. In the absence of leadership from either the White House or the State Department, my successor, a career diplomat, has been moved to only the mildest of tut-tuts by Moi's most egregious oppressive acts. One is ashamed to admit that since 1993, Germany, not the United States, has become and remained the most outspoken advocate of human rights and democracy in Kenya.

The need for such an advocate is obvious. In 1993 alone 36 opposition members of Parliament were arrested, some of them several times. At least three important opposition publications have been fire bombed, trashed, padlocked, or otherwise run out of business.

All 15,000 copies of a book by Kenneth Matiba, one of the three opposition Presidential candidates, were confiscated by the police. The harassment of independent journalists in Kenya has continued. And opposition constituencies find it difficult to obtain development assistance. In a country in which half of the salaried jobs are in the public sector, opposition tribesmen find it difficult to obtain appointments or promotion.

Last year, the world famous paleontologist Richard Leakey, a double amputee and one of the founders of the opposition Safina (Noah's Ark) movement, was savagely beaten by KANU thugs while the police looked on. No arrests were made, of course. And Safina, 1 year after its founding, remains unregistered, which prevents it from raising money or recruiting members.
Small wonder that by 1994, opposition leader Paul Muite could describe the American embassy as “irrelevant” in the fight for democracy in Kenya.

Small wonder that on the occasion of my successor’s departure from Nairobi the other day, Moi was moved to praise her performance as ambassador.

Earlier, one international survey had identified Moi as the world’s ninth most oppressive leader. Another asserted that Kenya was the globe’s third most corrupt nation.

Whether my successor’s successor, Prudence Bushnell, another career officer, will have the guts to stand up to President Moi is anybody’s guess.

It must be acknowledged that the “second liberation of Africa” at best has been only a limited success. But it has been a success, if a small one. In 1989, only 4 of 44 African nations had multi-party political systems. Since then, some 33 have taken at least their first hesitant steps toward expanding democracy.

In five African countries—Benin, Zambia, Malawi, South Africa, and Sierra Leone—in incumbent Presidents and their ruling parties have been voted out of office in free and fair elections.

But in others—such as Kenya, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea—authoritarian rulers have clung to power despite strong opposition.

In at least two other countries—Nigeria and Niger—the army has intervened to supplant civilian rule.

So the success of the drive which began with such high hopes in 1989 is by no means assured. While it is only one factor in a complicated equation, these infant democratic movements could well be strangled in their cribs if the international community, led by the American President, does not give them its strong public support. There is little evidence of an understanding of this in the White House today, in my view.

Nobody ever suggested that the evolution of democracy in Africa would be either quick or easy. Modern democracy evolved in Northern Europe at a specific period of history to meet the needs and aspirations of the people who lived there. It was shored up by indigenous institutions, buttressed by certain shared assumptions. It has prospered most where there is a strong sense of commonwealth, a high sense of literacy, and a decent standard of living.

Now, the historical dice were loaded against the Africans from the start. Tribal society had valued conformity more than innovation, solidarity more than individual action. Dissent frequently was equated with sedition. Leaders demanded, and received, total loyalty and unthinking obedience. Colonial rule, while it took new forms, reinforced this tradition. Nor was time on the side of the Africans.

The haste of the colonial powers’ scramble to get into the continent in the 1880’s was matched only by their unseemly hurry—under pressure from the United States, one must add—to abandon the continent in the 1960’s.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Ambassador, if you could begin to make your concluding remarks.

Mr. HEMPSTONE. I'm sorry?

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could begin to make your concluding remarks in the interest of time. Thank you.
Mr. Hempstone. All right. Fine.
Well, it is not working very well. I see no support from the White House. And I think it is important that it should work, important if America is to remain true to its ideals.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hempstone can be found in the appendix.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Dr. Crocker.

STATEMENT OF CHESTER CROCKER, LANDEGGER DISTINGUISHED RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF DIPLOMACY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Crocker. Thank you, Madam Chair, gentlemen.
I am privileged to have a chance to appear before you on this subject.
I have five brief points to make and will keep them to about 1 minute per point.
First of all, I think it is fair to say that this Administration has not ignored Africa, and that is a plus. There have been a lot of words. There have been a lot of speeches. There have been a lot of visits by quite a few senior people. I think particularly of the late Ron Brown. I think of Tony Lake. Madeleine Albright. John Deutsch. Hazel O'Leary. Vice President Gore.
That is a lot of frequent flier miles. And now even the Secretary of State has decided to jet down and pay the place a visit.
The White House in 1994 held the first-ever White House Conference on Africa as an effort to underscore the importance of the region.
And I would say as a former Assistant Secretary that visits and speeches can be important. They can be important symbolically. They can be important substantively. And it all depends on what they are used for. They can be used, basically, for creating visual effects, for photo ops; or they can be used to really change events and for substance.
I think the hallmark of the Administration has been, in many ways, a reluctance to become substantively engaged and involved but, at the same time, to talk and to visit and to underscore, at the rhetorical level, that the region is important so that, in a sense, the bottom line—as I think many of our African friends and our non-African partners have perceived something of a policy vacuum, a reluctance to play the role they would expect of us, the role that they are used to us playing—an uncertainty as to whether there really is a policy on some of key questions in Africa. But despite all that, a lot of visits, a lot of events, and a good deal of talk.
The second observation that I would make is that Africa is, increasingly, a very hard place to have a single policy toward. Just like it is hard to have a single policy toward Asia. It is a very complex place, lots of different entities. And differentiation of Africa is really the name of the game.
I think the Administration has spent some of its time developing continent-wide policy thrusts. For example, dealing with issues like food security, health, environmental issues, preventative diplomacy
in general terms, but sometimes at the expense of direct, sustained, and focused engagement on the real specific challenges that we actually face.

It is OK to have the region-wide thrusts; but we also need to have the engagement on specifics, on really hard cases that are very high on everyone's list of priorities, for example, Nigeria or Liberia or Sudan or Angola or Zaire or Mozambique. The specifics need to be addressed as well as the generalities.

A third observation—and this is a rather ironic one—this Administration has done a great deal to put Africa on the map in terms of our economic and commercial relationships. In fact, that probably is their strongest suit, aggressive outreach to Africans and to the American business community as partners in helping Africa to develop and in pushing American commercial interests there. And not only, I might say, in South Africa. As a free marketeer and a private sector person myself, I can only applaud that emphasis. It is good to see it.

I must say that I find it kind of ironic, there is a kind of schizoid, schizophrenic quality because on the one hand you have this strong commercial thrust, but on the other hand you have what I might call a "look-ma-no-hands" approach to the most intractable political and military problems that the continent faces. Sort of as if we could wrap our arms around the winners and distance ourselves, or at least hold our nose and not do a whole lot, with the more difficult cases. And I just do not think you can do it that way.

There is a link, there is a relationship between the Ghanas and the Botswanas on the one hand and the Zaires and the Nigerias on the other. And that link is places that are in transition, places like Zambia for example, where the balance between success and failure of transition away from autocracy and statism is very finely balanced; or places like South Africa which are trying to become, obviously, a successful transition state. And I would hope that we can do more than simply wrap our arms around the more attractive cases and cultivate warm fuzzy relations with the more attractive governments.

As a former diplomat, I am accustomed to warm, fuzzy relations; but we need to wrap our arms around the hard cases, too. And in that regard, I might cite the Gore-Mbeki Commission on South Africa, which I think is an example of an institutional framework which can get to grips with some hard issues; and I am glad to see that it is beginning to do so in a few cases, but much more could be done.

Fourth, as I have indicated, I see a gap between rhetoric and substance where real engagement is called for. I worry about some of the hardest cases. I mentioned Nigeria several times; Liberia also I could cite; Zaire. I just see us avoiding the kind of roll-up-your-sleeves engagement that it seems to me would be called for.

In my view, the United States has no higher priority than to address the problems of civil strife and collapsed states, the whole spectrum of peacemaking activities, because without local and regional order, none of our other interests and concerns are going to be advanced; we are not going to see Africa develop; we are not going to see Africa become more democratic, to move toward stronger human rights observance or greater gender equality; or
more environmental security, if there is not order. And I think we have got to get the priorities straight.

And what is ironic is that we in the United States are pretty good at this stuff, so we should be leading more often, in my view, than we are.

When we do get involved, there is an opaqueness at times to the priorities; and I just would throw this out for possible discussion. Burundi is an important place. Terrific humanitarian crisis. I am glad we are engaged. But why Burundi and not Liberia? It is a bit mindboggling. And I think that is really the words of the Africans themselves: What happened to Liberia?

A final thought, quickly: Africa is a frontier. It is a place where people, in fact, are beginning to differentiate themselves very strongly between the winners and the losers. There are lots of emerging markets. There are lots of Africans as well as outsiders making a good dollar in Africa today.

It is also a place that is traumatized by disease, in many areas by disorder, by malgovernance, and by criminal business enterprise. So you have both. And my point is Africa is in transition. It is being shaped by those who decide to get involved. If Africa does fail, it is not just Africans who will be the losers.

In 1995, U.S. exports to Sub-Saharan Africa were only 1 percent of the world total; but that was 1½ times our exports to the former Soviet Union.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crocker can be found in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.
Dr. Gordon.

STATEMENT OF DAVID GORDON, DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES POLICY PROGRAMS, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

Dr. Gordon. Madam Chair, I would like to thank you and members of the committee for inviting me to testify on the Clinton administration's performance in Africa. This is an important topic, and I commend you for holding this hearing today.

I am particularly pleased to be sharing the table with Ambassador Hempstone, with whom I had the great privilege to serve when he was the U.S. ambassador to Kenya.

I also want to commend you, Madam Chair, and other members of the committee, for the very diligent efforts of their talented and hard-working staffs.

The views that I express this afternoon are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my colleagues at the Overseas Development Council or its board of directors.

In a recent issue of the journal Foreign Policy, as an exception to his generally favorable assessment of the Clinton administration's conduct of foreign policy, Richard Ullman, a relatively liberal analyst, gave the Administration a failing grade for its Africa policy, with the tart comment: "No cold war = no policy."

This afternoon, my colleagues around this table, none of whom will take umbrage at the label "conservative", are presenting their own critical comments about the Administration's policy.
So the Clinton administration Africa policy has come under criticism from both sides of the political spectrum.

I believe that while not without weaknesses, the Administration’s performance in Africa has been basically sound. Before moving onto the details of this assessment, let me comment briefly on the context within which U.S.-Africa policy operates.

First is the peculiar limbo status of Africa in post-cold war foreign policy. It is stuck between ill-defined but real American interests and Africa’s peripherality to central U.S. strategic or vital concerns.

Absent the cold war framework, the determination of U.S. interests for a number of regions has been in dispute. Nowhere has this been more difficult than for Africa.

In this context, approaches to Africa by advocates of many political stripes tends to veer among absolutes, either complete hand-washing; domination by a single theme, be it environment or democracy or trade promotion; or massive overextension.

The Administration has been generally successful in balancing these disparate views and moderating pressures from all camps.

Second, the Administration has been inundated with immediate crises in Africa, and this has complicated efforts to articulate and implement broader, conceptual themes for policy. Hopefully Secretary Christopher’s impending trip to Africa will help address this issue.

Third, in the aftermath of Somalia and the 1994 election, U.S.-Africa policy has been under something of a state of siege. Specific calls from Senators Helms and McConnell to substantially cut U.S. assistance to Africa, and large cuts in the international affairs budget, have left Africa policymakers on the defensive.

Despite this very challenging political context, on the whole, the Clinton administration’s record on Africa is positive.

Moreover, as in other areas of foreign policy, the Administration is settling onto a more steady tack after some initial rough waters.

The Administration worked effectively for change in South Africa and has built a very positive relationship with the new South Africa. It has played a crucial role in reinvigorating the peace process in Angola. It has increased pressure on the terrorists supporting the Islamic fundamentalist regime in Sudan. It has provided strong international leadership on humanitarian relief, especially in the Horn of Africa.

Finally, the Administration has made Africa a priority within the U.S. foreign aid program, protecting the African accounts from the Draconian cuts that have been taken to programs in Asia and Latin America.

The Administration has been somewhat less successful in other areas. It has had difficulties generating consensus in action in response to the derailing of the democratic transaction in Nigeria.

Chastened by Somalia, the United States, as well as other countries, failed to take preventative action that just might have mitigated the tragedy in Rwanda in 1994.

And while successfully defending bilateral aid, the Administration has been less successful in defending the U.S. contribution to the soft-loan window of the World Bank, nearly one half of whose resources go to Africa.
Support for democratization, the facilitation of conflict resolution, and promotion of economic reform and sustainable development are the tripod of the Administration’s Africa policy. These themes reflect essential continuity of U.S. Africa policy in the post-cold war era.

It is unfortunate that the bipartisan continuity in U.S. policy has not been better recognized.

The United States has stopped supporting dictators and military regimes in Africa. Today U.S. aid resources are directed to those African countries most dedicated to reform and with the best prospects for trade and investment. Among our leading recipients are South Africa, Uganda, Ghana, Ethiopia and Mali, all of which are going through difficult dual transitions to democracy and a market economy.

U.S. aid is playing an important role in facilitating the return to economic growth and stability that is occurring in most African countries. Partially as a result of these efforts, most African countries have growth rates of over 3 percent per year, and U.S. exports to Africa are growing at a rate of some 20 percent annually.

Taking into account the inherent difficulties in promoting democracy in Africa, the Clinton administration’s effort here is also strong. As one of Africa’s most astute observers, Professor Ali Mazrui, noted in testimony before the subcommittee: “The United States must recognize the paradox of a strong African desire for democracy combined with a fragile African capability for it.”

The fact that the Administration has not made democracy promotion the be-all and end-all of its Africa policy is a sign of flexibility and maturity rather than failure.

The Administration has signaled U.S. support for democratization by increasing aid programs in new democracies and closing down or substantially downsizing programs in countries where autocrats have hijacked democratic transitions.

The United States played an important role in all of southern Africa’s democratic transitions which has increased our influence in that region. This influence is already paying dividends to the United States. In the debate on the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, South Africa lent its considerable moral stature to the U.S. effort to achieve an extension of the treaty and was a significant factor in our success.

The Administration has also worked to advance conflict-resolution and conflict-prevention in Africa. Working with members of this committee from both parties, the Administration helped shape the Africa Conflict Resolution Act of 1994.

It is now undertaking an intense effort, along with a number of European states, to develop a strategy for enhancing the military capacity of African peacekeeping forces.

Again, working with a bipartisan group of Members of Congress, the Administration is currently developing a more coordinated approach to facilitating U.S. trade and investment in Africa.

Madam Chair, you asked the panelists today for suggestions on how the United States should approach various issues affecting the African continent. A crucial place to start is with U.S. interests in Africa.
Any hard-headed analysis of Africa must conclude that with the exception of Sudan’s ties to international terrorists, U.S. security concerns in Africa are marginal; but America does have real interests.

We have humanitarian interests.
We have economic interests.
Transnational issues directly affecting the United States can only be addressed through cooperation with African partners.

And, finally, the African American community wants the United States to be engaged in Africa. And a successful foreign policy must reflect and incorporate the views, values, and concerns of all segments of our society.

To respond to these interests, the United States needs a combination of short- and long-term approaches.

For the short-term, the question is how the United States can decide where and when to act beyond emergency relief in crisis or potential crisis situations.
The cold realities are that, in most instances, we will not be able to successfully engage or intervene; but there will be cases where the United States should not disengage.

First, in large states that hold the key to regional stability. For instance, the collapse of Nigeria into chaos or civil war would have regional repercussions that could unleash waves of instability and migration throughout West Africa.

Second, are countries where the United States has significant economic interests, such as Angola and Nigeria.

Third, countries with close historic ties to the United States in which there is a broad consensus in the international community and in Africa that the United States is the relevant external power. Only Liberia and Ethiopia fall into this category.

Finally, we cannot ignore crises where, barring international action, large numbers of people face eminent death. While the defining lines here will necessarily be fuzzy, this includes impending mass starvation or genocide. Despite the inherent risks, there will be no alternatives sometimes to intervention.

In the long-term, successful development will be the key for preventing crises addressing humanitarian concerns and taking advantage of economic opportunities.

The good news is that the prospects for development in Africa have never been better and that a broad consensus has emerged on a strategy for development consistent with U.S. interests.

This strategy emphasizes effective economic management, promotion of the private sector, investment in basic health and education, reducing population growth, and strengthening the international underpinnings for development.

At the center of this consensus is the belief that while external assistance can be helpful, the primary impetus for development can only come from within.

How can the United States best support this agenda?
First, by continuing to support the International Development Association, the soft-loan window of the World Bank. IDA resources remain central to promoting economic reform and investments in basic health, education, and infrastructure all over Africa.
Second, by ensuring that as African countries recover economically and begin to increase their exports, they do not run into restrictive trade barriers, such as the Multi-Fiber Arrangements.

Third, by better concentrating bilateral assistance efforts. A reformed U.S. bilateral aid program in Africa should focus on those countries with the best developmental prospects and in four key substantive areas: population and health, governance, microenterprise development, and on deepening trade and investment linkages between U.S. firms and 600 million potential African consumers.

To conclude, given the crisis-ridden political context within which it has had to operate, the Clinton team's overall record in Africa is positive. By emphasizing the areas that I have highlighted, the next Administration, whether led by President Clinton or Senator Dole, can do an even better job of focusing policy in ways that will serve U.S. interests in Africa into the next century.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gordon can be found in the appendix.]

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Good spin control. Thank you.

Mr. Kansteiner.

STATEMENT OF WALTER KANSTEINER III, SENIOR FELLOW, THE FORUM FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND FORMER DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. Kansteiner. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate the invitation today.

African policy can be summed up in really three core issues: conflict resolution, political reform, and economic and commercial development. That has really been the three core issues that all Administrations for the past couple of decades have looked at when it comes to Africa.

I would just like to spend a few minutes looking at one of these sectors, and that is the economic and commercial.

Trade and investment between Africa and the United States is rising significantly. It is good news. About 12 percent increase this past year alone. We are exporting $18 billion worth of American goods to the continent. That is about the same as we export to eastern Europe. Africa is a big market for us.

Direct equity investments are also up. U.S. companies have as much invested in South Africa alone as they do in Israel, Turkey, or India. It is surprising that that level is there and continues to increase.

Africa has some economic problems that they have got to get over. Corruption is rampant in some sectors. And they have got major debt problems.

Nonetheless, the Clinton administration caught onto this possible new market fairly early. By 1994, as Dr. Crocker made reference to, they held a White House Conference on Africa. The rhetoric was extremely good. The speeches were all about building the private sector in Africa, making it work.

Unfortunately, there was not much real policy prescription at the end of the day. There was excellent advocacy. Again, as Chester re-
marked about Secretary Ron Brown’s many trips to Africa, they not only helped U.S. companies gain contracts and encouraged them to make investments; but what Ron Brown really did for Africa was sit down African leaders and explain to them that they had to get their economic house in order before they were going to see any investment dollars. That was a terrific service that Mr. Brown did for Africa, as well as for our American companies.

Unfortunately, since his death, we have seen less interaction from the Commerce Department on this advocacy level.

But back very quickly to the question of policy. Advocacy is great. It is important. U.S. companies certainly appreciate it.

But what general policies has the Clinton administration pursued in these last 4 years?

They seem to be scattered, and they do not seem to be well followed up. I believe the next Administration needs to push and cajole and influence and grab the attention of the African leaders as best they can to forcefully pursue free market economic policies.

It is really Africa’s only chance.

You know, African governments control far too much of their economies today, through state ownerships, through parastatals. The domination is really quite complete. That cobol has to be broken. Outside investors have to be given a chance. And inside investors, the private sector, the indigenous private sector, needs to be given a chance as well.

And I think the next Administration, either Republican or Democrat, needs to push hard on things like privatization, push hard on encouraging Africans to look at free trade zones; southern Africa, for instance, is a terrific opportunity to create a free trade zone. Every country in the region would benefit from it. And the United States needs to take the lead and show them how to do it. NAFTA was not easy, as we all know; but we learned some important lessons on regional trade zones. And we can share some of these experiences with the Africans.

I think, finally, we need to take a hard look at debt. African countries have an enormous amount of debt. Perhaps we can start putting together a program not unlike the Brady scheme in the Brady bills for African debt.

These are just, quickly, some ideas that I think the next Administration has to grapple with if Africa is really going to have a chance to be a participant in the world economic and commercial game.

Thanks very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kansteiner can be found in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, to all of our panelists.

Let me begin by asking a general question to all or whoever would like to answer it.

Do you believe that the leaders of our policy in Africa, at the Assistant Secretary or at the ambassador level, are receiving the type of support that they need from the Secretary and other high-ranking officials, including the President, and is it the kind of support that they would need to conduct an effective American policy in Africa? Is that support there, in your view?
Mr. HEMPSTONE. Well, I would say that what is really missing is not the support, which would be needed if our ambassadors found themselves in a situation of confrontation.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Would you repeat that, Ambassador Hempstone?

Mr. HEMPSTONE. Yes. I do not think it is a question so much of support, Madam Chair, as it is of leadership, of letting the State Department and our ambassadors know what the President wants them to do and then following up on that and then supporting them when they need that support.

Mr. CROCKER. Madam Chair, I guess I would have to maybe go one step further and say I do not know if the people who actually send out cables and implement the instructions in them have a sense that they are being encouraged from the very top to take a lead and to get involved if it looks like it might not lead to a quick victory. It is an attitude of mind, more than anything else.

It is not to say that you need the Secretary or the President to be following the intricate details of what takes place day-to-day on the ground in a place like Angola, but rather: Do the fifth floor and the sixth floor at the State Department and in the embassies, do they have the sense that if they do put forward a proposal, an idea, talk to a foreign government and have a trial balloon that they will not be discouraged from doing that?

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Let me ask a similar type of question, then, for the other panelists.

Do you believe that America is perceived as a leader in Africa today? Is it helping to define the problems and trying to work toward solutions to those problems, especially in such places like Sudan and Burundi and other hot spots?

Dr. GORDON. I think that the United States has an unprecedented reputation in Africa today. And that creates some difficulties because African expectations are very high. I think Africa expects the United States to be engaged and to be engaged actively. In Africa, as is the case almost anywhere in the world, substantial things do not get done without American participation and leadership. And I think that the Africans know that. I think that we played a crucial role in getting the peace talks back on track in Angola, that they had hit the skids, nobody else was going to come up to the plate to take the lead on that. In Liberia, we are engaged—I personally believe we should be engaged somewhat more—no one else is going to be able to take the lead to solve that crisis.

When the international community did respond to the crisis in Rwanda, our logistical support was absolutely necessary. Nobody else could do the things that we had to do.

So I think that U.S. leadership remains crucial and that the Africans have a very high expectation toward the United States, that they basically are seeing that democracy and the free market economy and the ideals that we have represented are ideals that lead to progress. And they want to engage with us and expect us to be engaged with them.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Let me ask the panelists to comment on what Mr. Kansteiner had talked about, initiatives that can be undertaken. He mentioned a free trade zone area in southern Africa;
he mentioned economic changes, such as privatizing a lot of the in-
dustries that are in government control.

What initiatives do you see that Congress can take along these
lines or other kinds of reforms, especially tied to the economies of
these African countries? Where could we have a role in stimulating
that?

Mr. Crocker. I think we have seen the public resources to sup-
port our African and economic and commercial interests somewhat
cut back. We have seen our foreign posts abroad somewhat cut
back under the pressures that have come from both sides of the
aisle vis-a-vis the executive branch. We are supporting our foreign
affairs function with less resources comparative today than we ever
have, going back to the days of Harry Truman. I mean, it is not
a proud moment in terms of American foreign affairs leadership
and funding. That reduction process has gone far enough and needs
to be reversed.

To be more specific, in reference to what Mr. Kansteiner was
talking about, it is amazing that folks have the impression some-
how that OPIC is a form of corporate welfare. I do not know where
that line of thought came from. But I live and breathe in the pri-
vate sector. I am a post-government person these days, Madam
Chair. And I can tell you the private sector in this country is
screaming: “What happened to OPIC?” Well, they did not get their
voice across, I guess.

So OPIC needs to be restored. I would like to see more attention
to Africa at Eximbank and more countries getting cover through
Eximbank in Africa to support our exporters.

So there are some quite specific commercial initiatives that
might make a difference.

Dr. Gordon. In this regard, Madam Chair, I think that the new
initiative that is being led by Representative Crane, Representative
McDermott, and Representative Rangel really will provide an op-
portunity. There are several things in there that are going to be
very important for promoting the kinds of changes that Mr.
Kansteiner was talking about.

The first is setting up a forum whereby there are periodic meet-
ings between senior economic officials in Africa and senior officials
in this country.

The second is setting up a negotiation process for a U.S.-Africa
free trade arrangement.

And then the third, and I think very important, are mechanisms
to exempt African countries from the restrictions posed by the
Multi-Fiber Arrangement so that when African countries begin to
export, particularly in the textile sector, they will not run up
against trade barriers to American markets.

And I think these initiatives that are now being introduced in
the Congress—and I expect will be fleshed out in the 105th Con-
gress—will be a very specific and significant way that Congress can
play an active role.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Let me ask you one last question just on the
movement toward democracy in Africa, an area where Dr. Gordon
says President Clinton has shown maturity and flexibility.

When you have a place like Kenya, where you have an authori-
tarian leader who has returned to power through a rigged or totally
flawed election, what should the U.S. response to those types of so-called elections be?

Should we take punitive steps such as reducing aid? What other kinds of tools are available to us to deal with these kinds of situations?

Dr. Gordon. I think Ambassador Hempstone did an outstanding job in promoting the U.S. theme of democratization in Africa. I worked with him on that, and I was very pleased to be part of his team.

We have responded to the poor rate of progress in democratization in Kenya. We have cut our total foreign assistance levels to Kenya substantially, by more than 50 percent.

More important, with very few exceptions, most of the aid that we now give to Kenya is to non-governmental organizations. So we are giving very little support to the Kenya Government directly.

We have also engaged a wide range of non-governmental organizations in the civil society sector to try to help build their strengths and their capacities.

I think those are appropriate steps. I think that at certain moments in time we also have to engage in more spirited diplomacy. And I would hope that Ambassador Bushnell does not keep spirited diplomacy outside of her tool box.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.

Ambassador Hempstone, I do not know if you would want to comment?

Mr. Hempstone. I would have very little to add to that except to say that it is not easy, and it is not easy for the ambassador involved. You have to have the hide of a rhinoceros to deal with a fellow like President Moi under these circumstances.

But we know what needs to be done in an economic sense, and they know it. And it is just a matter of keeping them aware that we care what they are doing.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.

Congressman Johnston.

Mr. Johnston. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And I might say, this may be the most important subcommittee meeting that has been held in a decade for the continent of Africa. And I mean that sincerely. Because you may deal with it as a whole here, but as Ambassador Crocker says, you have to have separate policies for different areas of Africa.

I am a little ambivalent here, you know, because I agree almost with everything everyone is saying here; but to a degree, I have to defend the Administration or at least attack the previous Administration.

And I am a little schizophrenic, Madam Chair. Bear with me for my catharsis here.

Clinton was sworn in on January 16th, I think, and this is what he inherited in Africa: Mobutu in Zaire; Savimbi in Angola, Banda in Malawi; Babangida in Nigeria; Charles Taylor in Liberia; Turabi in Bashir and Sudan; Aideed in Somalia; Qadhafi in Libya; Kerekou in Benin; Bongo in Gabon; and Buyoya in Burundi.

Am I right, Ambassador Crocker, on that laundry list?

Mr. Crocker. Sounds pretty good to me, Congressman.

Dr. Gordon. I think Kerekou was gone already.
Mr. Johnston. No. I met Soglo right after the election. So it was right about the same time.

But all these people were there 12 years previous to Clinton's swearing in. So I just want to point out the fact that dealing with Africa is not as easy as it may seem. The same day he was sworn in, there were 25,000 troops in Somalia put there by President Bush, as something I agree with. I think President Bush should have done that.

So it was not easy. And I think George Moose inherited something—the continent that was very, very hard to deal with.

Ambassador, I met with President Moi last Sunday. He sends you his regards.

May I mail to him your testimony in here where you say: "Moi was no Caligula"? And I am sure he would be happy to get that.

Ambassador, you used the term "career diplomat" as almost a pejorative term here. May I say that I was with Ambassador Brazeal. I was in Kenya last year a day after Leakey had gotten beaten. He got beaten badly. And the first audience that Ambassador Brazeal, a career diplomat, had with Moi was a very—I mean, she tore into him. I mean, I was almost under the table, you know, that an ambassador would deal with a President of a country in the way that she did. And I think that the fact that he congratulated her when she left, you have to admit that he probably liked her better than he likes you.

Mr. Hempstone. I am sure of that.

Mr. Johnston. That is right. And I think that Ambassador Bushnell will be tough.

Mr. Hempstone. I hope so.

Mr. Johnston. And I was going to ask Ambassador Crocker if there is something wrong with career diplomats, but I shall not. Because I think he is one. But I have seen political appointees in Africa, and the ones that I saw were disasters. And I have seen career diplomats there who are subject to the Stockholm Syndrome, if you know what I mean. They become part of the country that they live in. And I come back and I tell George Moose that. And, apparently, it is an occupational disease among ambassadors.

Mr. Hempstone. Yes, it is.

Mr. Johnston. You taught at the Virginia Military Institute and the University of the South. My daughter went to the University of the South, and I am a graduate of VMI.

Mr. Hempstone. Good.

Mr. Johnston. So I am not all bad, even though I am a Democrat, Ambassador.

But I would like to ask you, I have read your statement, and it is very good, but it is mainly a condemnation of Africa and not of the African policy of the Clinton administration.

What was the African policy of the Reagan administration? Did Reagan ever go to Africa? Did George Shultz ever go to Africa?

Mr. Hempstone. Well, I was not in public service at that time. I should know the answer to that.

But certainly Mr. Crocker would know the answer.

Mr. Crocker. Secretary Shultz did go to Africa.

Mr. Johnston. Did he? OK.
Congressman Payne and I extracted a promise from the President that he would go to Africa during his first term. He is going to have to hustle to make it, I might say, in the next 6 weeks; but we Democrats hope he will be there in the second term.

I will get to questioning in the next round, Madam Chair.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Harry.

Congressman Payne.

Mr. Payne. I think my colleague, Mr. Houghton, is over there.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Oh, I am so sorry. Thank you, Mr. Payne.

Amo, I apologize.

Mr. Houghton. No, no, no. Go ahead.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.

Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. I went to Mr. Houghton’s fundraiser the other day. I think I kind of lost him some support.

Let me also say that I think Representative Johnston certainly brought out some very interesting points. I find myself agreeing also with a number of the points made by the whole panel. As a matter of fact, there is very little, Chester Crocker, that I disagree with what you said. I also supported OPIC. I thought it was a terrible vote to eliminate that. It just made no sense at all. But there is a lot of nonsense that is really going on.

I, too, look at the problems. And we talked about the President visiting Africa. And like we said, maybe he will be able to do it in the second term. But I have been very critical of the policy. I do not think enough attention has been given to Africa by this Administration and a number of the policies that the Administration has conducted. I thought we were too slow in Rwanda. I thought that we could have released those 50 armored vehicles that were being requested. I think that we should have been able to move some of the willing African troops that were willing to go into Rwanda at that time.

About the time that Mr. Mandela was being sworn in, a group of African countries had a meeting in South Africa and were not anxious but there were some Ghanians and some other troops that were willing to go; but the whole question of the logistics and the cost of transportation and that sort of thing was brought up as a problem of cost. And so 500,000 people ended up being massacred. So I have been very critical of a number of our policies.

I think in Liberia we should have had a better policy.

And the White House Conference on Africa, just for your information, was totally boycotted by the Black Caucus. We thought that it was a great idea, but we felt it was not going to be any more than a photo opportunity and that the policy did not show any real interest. And also the fact that you do not put together a White House conference in a month if you want to be serious about it.

And so I have been outspoken about the policies. It does not necessarily make me popular over there, but I just have to speak what I think is the truth.

Also, though, I have to be critical of the previous policy, as Mr. Johnston brought out, that created many of these problems. The 1985 election in Liberia that you actually certified, which was a fraudulent election and began the continued problems of Doe in Liberia, and actually the refusal to have the United States remove Doe, which would have been very easy at the time with the Ma-
rines when we met with Brent Scowcroft and others to say if we remove Doe at the time, we think that the Liberian situation could end. But the Bush administration said no. I think that was a serious mistake.

I also think that the policies that were inherited by the Clinton administration; the support for UNITA, the creation of rogue leaders like Mobutu from our policies of the cold war, the support of Renamo, even though it was denied by conservative Republicans when they were in Rhodesia under Ian Smith and moved to Mozambique, and created the civil war there, the constructive engagement in South Africa—South Africa would still be under an apartheid regime if it had not been for the override of Mr. Reagan’s veto.

And I still commend Senator Lugar and some of the other men who had enough courage to say that that policy was wrong and voted to override that veto. As a matter of fact, I think it was only by one vote and probably President Reagan, I understand, is still a little annoyed at Senator Lugar, who is his good friend. But I think he did the right thing, because I doubt if we would have seen the type of government we have today.

And so I think really Africa has just been mismanaged by all the Administrations. I think today, though, that the whole continent of Africa is moving more in the right direction. I think we even made mistakes. When we went to Somalia, which was right, we did not even tell Kenya that we were going to use Mombasa to bring in our planes, which was wrong. I mean that was another mistake, and it took a couple of days before we then told the Kenyan Government: Oh, incidentally, you read in the papers we want to use that to come into Somalia.

So there are really a lot of mistakes that we were all aware of. I think the answer is: What do we do in the future? I think that there are successes with Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Ghana are all moving, 4, 5, 6, 7 percent growth in their economic GNP annually, which is fantastic; the southern rim is all at peace for the time being. If you take from Zaire down, you have got places that there is domestic tranquility, things are far from right; but there is an absence of war, anyway. And I think that it is a tremendous opportunity at this time with the elections as we mentioned in Zambia and Malawi where there has not been any kind of military upheaval with leaders of over 25 years being turned out.

So there is a lot of potential, and I think that collectively, maybe some people from the previous Administration and some of the people from the current Administration could come together. And if we are really talking about Africa being able to have a sound policy into the 21st century, it may be a time that we could all come together and forget all of the errors and mistakes that we made and use our collective abilities to see about forging ahead with a policy that would be beneficial to Africa.

I will ask questions on the next round. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

Congressman Houghton. And I apologize again.

Mr. HOUGHTON. No. Anybody who comes to my fundraisers always has precedence.
I guess I am always a bit from Missouri on these hearings because we talk a lot about the problems; we do not talk about the solutions; we talk about the past and not about the future.

I suppose 10 years from now, we will be sitting here and probably there will be another set of problems that are equally as bad: The Administration will not have been bold enough, or Congress would have been too pinch penny, or the African nations will not have helped themselves.

But it would seem to me that in looking at any grouping of countries—and maybe Africa is a bad grouping, maybe there should be the rim, Sub-Saharan Africa, or east and west or whatever it is—there ought to be some sort of an understanding of where we are going. And I do not sense that from the Administration. I did not sense it from previous Administrations either. Maybe that is because I was not listening too well.

But I really think it is important that as we end hearings like this, we know what distinguished people like yourselves feel.

Are there one or two key things we really ought to keep our eye on because they are sort of endemic, they are trend setters, they are critical structural issues that are going to be with us unless we do something about them?

And where it is Nigeria or Sierra Leone or Liberia or Western Sahara, what are the one or two things that really we ought to go away from this meeting with to keep in the back of our minds?

Mr. Crocker. Anyone?

Mr. Houghton. Yes. Doctor, go ahead, please.

Mr. Crocker. I tried to indicate one very important priority, near the top of the list, if not at the very top, which is to get the law and order equation right.

And I mean that term “law and order” in terms of a genuine structure of order that is legitimate, both in the regions of Africa and within African countries. Because I do not think you can do anything without that.

So as I look at the balance sheet, I see some real positives and, I agree with much of what Congressman Payne has just said about the positives. There are some successes. There are some in the winners’ column.

But some that are not in the winners’ column are major, major countries that are bigger than the United States east of the Mississippi. We are talking Zaire. We are talking Algeria. We are talking Sudan.

Africa cannot afford to have those stay in the losers’ column, or it is going to undermine the winners. So that has got to be one the issues up there.

The success of economic engagement with Africa would be another—

Mr. Houghton. Could I just interrupt a minute? Africa cannot afford that. But Africa is affording that. So what part do we play in not having them afford that?

Mr. Crocker. Well, it is taking a huge chunk out of Africa’s hide, that those endemic situations of unresolved political transition or civil strife continue in those vast countries. It is slowing down the positive trends that others and I have addressed.
And it risks reversing the positive trends. I mean, let us just focus on Zaire for a minute. It is obviously at a key juncture in its own evolution. There is a lot of talk about elections. We all know, in fact, how Zaire is governed.

What is going to happen next year? Does Zaire remain sort of one place? Does it become 9 places or 10 or 20 places? What happens to neighboring countries if the balloon goes up in Zaire? It could set some trends back negatively, affecting places like Angola or Zambia, Malawi.

So that is the kind of balance sheet. And that brings us into it. If we want to be serious with Zaire, we need to sit down with the players who count in Zaire. That is some key neighbors and it is some key allies. We know who they are. And let us discuss soft landings and transitions in Zaire and roll up our sleeves and get serious. We are not doing that.

That is the kind of thing I would put up on the top of the list, but there may be some other candidates that others have.

Mr. KANSTEINER. On the economic side, I think some of the key markers, as you would suggest, might be how these African economies are actually structured; that is, who owns the productive assets, the few assets that are productive? And nine times out of ten, it is the governments.

So I think one marker we can really keep our eye on is privatization. You know, are these governments going to follow their rhetoric? They all say they are going to privatize. But are they actually going to follow through and do it and let the private sector grow and prosper and make a living and provide better services to their people, goods and services?

So I think on the economic front, I think privatization is something we really ought to keep on the radar screen.

Dr. GORDON. Mr. Houghton, let me talk about one country issue and two more general issues.

I think that the single most important country issue that the international community and the United States has to face is Nigeria. Nigeria is Africa's largest country. It is a country that is in crisis. I think the international community has attempted to deal with this crisis. It has had a very difficult time in doing so. I think that it is very important to keep a combination of sticks and carrots and to be willing to utilize those sticks in order to gain the credibility that we are going to need to attain influence in Nigeria.

The two general themes I want to talk about are, first, enhancing the capacity of African peacekeeping forces. I think that most of us would agree that we will continue to see crises in Africa that will call upon the international community to act and to intervene. On the one hand, we will want to do so; on the other hand, we will not be wanting to be involved. It is very important for the international community, working as a community, to address the issue of enhancing the capacity of Africa's own peacekeeping operations.

Second, is integrating Africa into the world economy. And I completely agree with Mr. Kansteiner, I think that privatization is an important issue; but it is part of this larger theme. The world economy is taking off. Africa, historically, has lagged behind.
Is Africa going to become an active partner in that economy, or is it going to lag behind and be a place where bad things are going to be happening over the medium term?

And I think, again, that the United States has an important role to play in that.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Amo.

Mr. Frazer.

Mr. Frazer. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Any member of the panel, in the past, the United States has been criticized for unilaterally trying to behave like the world’s police.

Could you tell me how successful are we expected to be?

If, in fact, it is the expectation by many of the countries in Africa—and I do not think that it is fair for us to view an African policy as though they were one country on a continent. Because to many Americans, they are countries on this continent that they do not even consider African: Libya, Algeria, Egypt. To the average American, they are countries, and that is just the reality. They do not even consider them as African countries.

Nigeria, Congo, Chad, those are familiar African countries. To the average American, this is Africa and not the ones in North Africa.

How can we get the American public to be supportive when, in fact, we continue to speak of this continent as though it were a country?

And why should we have an overall policy for Africa as opposed to having individual policies for the countries of Africa?

Yes, it has become obvious to most that the continent of Africa seems to have been pushed off the radar screen with the death of the Soviet Union and the birth of the new eastern European countries; and the Africans themselves believe that they are no longer important as far as the foreign policy of the United States is concerned.

But is it fair to say that the Clinton administration’s policy should be viewed in a vacuum as though the relationship that we have with these African countries is something new? And in fact, the President did inherit a lot of the situation that is currently ongoing.

Ambassador Hempstone, you know you were in Kenya, and it seems to me that the Administration, this Administration, the past Administration was not too successful in getting the leader of that country to adhere to the standards that we would like.

And we look at things like Mobutu in Zaire and Moi in Kenya and Charlie Taylor and his gang in Liberia, and it seems as though that the threats or the apparent promise to withhold certain aid has not really made some of these dictators or autocrats really adhere or practice what we would like to have them do.

But is it, therefore, fair to the United States to expect to bring about the kind of governments that we would like to see in Africa in a vacuum? Should we not have greater input? Or should there not be greater input from over countries? And should not the African countries themselves set more of the agenda as to the relationship with us?
Why should it always be our policies toward these countries as opposed to our policy with those countries?

Mr. HEMPFSTONE. Well, I think there is something in what you say, Congressman.

I would say, however, we did accomplish something in Kenya. We accomplished the first multi-party election in more than 25 years. We got Kenya's political support during the Gulf War. We were able to use Kenya for Operation Provide Relief to try and feed Somalia. And in fact in no instance were we unable to get what we wanted.

Nevertheless, I certainly agree with you that Africa ought to be making more of its own policy. You know, if they do not want to listen to us, that is certainly their privilege. I do not mind it at all when Germany takes a forward position, as they have in Kenya, particularly in the absence of one from the United States.

You know, somebody has got to do it. And how it is done is less important to me than it should be done.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Congressman Engel, glad to have you here with us. Thank you, Eliot.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. It is good to be back here with the subcommittee.

Two years ago, Mr. Johnston led a delegation to West Africa. Mr. Payne and I were there as well and a couple of other members. And one of the things that really sticks in my mind is that in every country we visited—Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, and Niger—the leadership, with the expense of Nigeria, but the leadership begged us to have American involvement both in terms of pushing to help establish democratic roots and to help toward a free market economy.

And I felt then, as I feel now, that we spent so much money to win the cold war and I think that the direction in which Congress is going, in terms of foreign aid is the wrong direction, because rather than pulling back, I think we should be expanding it, because I believe that foreign aid is not only good for the countries that we give it, but it is also good for America. And where a little bit of money could go such a long way in establishing democratic roots and establishing free markets economies.

The House, in the Development Fund for Africa passed a modest increase over the previous year, but still much under what I think we should be doing.

I would just like to hear your comments on what I have said and what your prognosis is for these countries, not only for West African countries but really all the countries. I just think we are missing the boat. I do not think it is the Administration's fault. I do not know if it is Congress' fault. But I think all of us, collectively, we are moving in the wrong direction.

Dr. GORDON. Well, Mr. Engel, I think that you have raised a very important point. I think that while most of what we see in the media concerning Africa focuses on the negative, in fact, there is really a very widespread and quite remarkable renaissance going on in Africa that is essentially positive, that the number of African countries with economic growth rates that are really respectable—3, 4, 5 percent, even higher—is now over 30. You have had impor-
tant successes in conflict resolution and the ending of substantial civil wars. And we have an opportunity now to engage Africa positively in a way that we have not in the past.

I agree with Ambassador Crocker that the reductions in our foreign affairs spending threaten to make it impossible for the United States to reap the benefits of these changed circumstances. And I think it is incumbent in the next session of Congress that both the Administration and the Congress come together and find a way to address that issue.

I know there is an effort now by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution that former Congressman Steve Solarz and Mickey Edwards are leading to address the issue of foreign affairs resources. But I think it is one that threatens to really hurt us, particularly in Africa.

Mr. Engel. It would seem to me, if there is one place in the world where the United States can really make a difference—and there are many places—but if I had to pick one region in terms of aid, in terms of the things that I spoke about, it would certainly be Africa. And I am not a prophet, but I hate to see our lack of engagement the way I believe we should be engaged now, sew the seeds for problems 10, 20, 30 years down the road.

Mr. Crocker. Congressman Engel, if I may respond, in addition to my colleague, Dr. Gordon, I do not think that Africa is a product of American foreign policy. And that also is, in a sense, in response to what Congressman Frazer was saying. We are effective at the margin in certain kinds of circumstances.

Second, I do not believe that AID will develop Africa. I think Africans will develop Africa. But we really are underfunding this part of the world. I have to identify with what you say. And it seems to me that we do so in a way that is very shortsighted because a dollar buys you more in Africa than most regions I know. The impact is greater. And we are very welcomed. So we really are being quite shortsighted. There is a lot of growth coming out of Africa, and there are a lot of jobs for Americans at stake, if Africa does well and those jobs are lost, if Africa does not do well. So it should be a case that can be described and sold in our national political discourse. I do not hear it.

Mr. Engel. I am sure before I came in Nigeria was mentioned. If it was, I hope I am not being redundant. If I am, please tell me. But when we visited Nigeria, I mean, to me, one of the biggest travesties in Africa is the fact that Nigeria (a country which has so much indigenous wealth and the people there should be reaping the wealth) has a ruined economy and dictatorship for so much of its history, since independence.

When we were there, we met with a body of people that were elected who we were told were going to draft a new constitution and draft a whole bunch of things. When we met with the people, we were all very encouraged that this was a force that would move in a positive direction.

Since we were there, of course, we have seen Nigeria, in my opinion, move backwards with assassinations and putting people to death and retrenching and having Mr. Abacha dig his heels in.
When we met with Mr. Abacha, we picked up inferences that he was not going to leave easily; and, unfortunately, those inferences were correct.

Has the United States been doing everything that we should be doing? If you touched on it, just please tell me and I will not be redundant. But it would seem to me that, of course, there is always more than can be done. But what are we doing? What should we be doing? What can we be doing? What shouldn’t we be doing that we have been doing?

I would like to hear your comments. And, again, if you have already said it, I will move on to the next.

Mr. CROCKER. Congressman Engel, I do not really think we have a policy toward Nigeria. I would not know where to find it. I would not know what rock to look under.

And I think the Administration has been torn somewhat between a kind of human rights reflex on the one hand which is to get involved and very much a corporate interest reflex on the other. We have very significant economic and commercial interests there, and we do not want to see them jeopardized since the only one who will gain will be our European commercial rivals.

The choices are not easy in Nigeria. We can either do what we are doing, which is not much of anything; we can get serious, interventionists, and try to get Mr. Abacha’s attention by, in effect, threatening him, threatening him where he lives, where he breathes; or we can try to help his own transition plans become something more significant.

He has committed himself to a transition. But if no one on the outside sits down with him and says: Listen, General Abacha, only under the following 16 conditions can the world work with your transition plan, that is the beginning of complicating his mind. He is not facing any difficult decisions coming from Washington or London, the major players. So I think he does not even know that we exist. I do not think he listens to us.

Mr. ENGEL. The New York Times, on September 16th, said in an editorial about Nigeria, it is lengthy, but in one paragraph it said: “Last month the White House dispatched Representative Bill Richardson to Nigeria to reopen direct discussions with Mr. Abacha. Unfortunately, the Administration’s offer of kinder treatment in return for steps toward democracy suggest that Washington is unwilling to press Mr. Abacha to end the abuses. To be effective, the American approach should be backed by specific sanctioned threats.”

I would be interested in hearing anybody’s comments about what I just read.

Dr. GORDON. Mr. Engel, the Administration has faced a very big dilemma on Nigeria. The Administration does support and has supported applying economic pressure on Nigeria. But they have rightfully concluded that to be effective, such pressures have to be multilateral.

The Administration has sought the support of Nigeria’s major trading partners for a modest set of multilateral economic pressures on Nigeria, and that support was not forthcoming.

That puts us in a very difficult situation. You know, what do we do in those circumstances?
I personally believe that we should be willing to undertake some modest efforts unilaterally as a way to both show our continued interest and to shame some of the other powers into undertaking more active measures themselves.

But I must say that it is a very difficult dilemma because the beneficiaries of this are likely to be the foreign competitors to U.S. firms.

Mr. Engel. Might one of those things that we do, perhaps, be to enact into law Mr. Payne's bill, which I am a co-sponsor of?

What do you think of the bill? And what do you think of oil sanctions, et cetera? What do you think of its potential effectiveness?

Dr. Gordon. Again, I think that Mr. Payne's bill is a good approach. I think that oil sanctions, as an ultimate weapon, are something that we should not take off the table.

Again, any sanction, to really be effective, would have to be multilateral. So I think the dilemma does not go away. But I think congressional action that both shows General Abacha that there is concern in the Congress and keeps the issue alive in our body politik is to be encouraged. And I am pleased that Mr. Payne is supporting this legislation.

Mr. Engel. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Elliot.

Just one question. From your monitoring of American policy, what would you say was the impact of the debacle in Somalia and the formation of the Administration's overall policy in Africa?

Do you believe that this was a watershed event in the formation of our policy, not only toward Somalia, but I mean towards all of Africa?

Mr. Crocker. Madam Chair, I certainly do. I think we draw the wrong lessons from Somalia as a country and as an administration. And it fed right into the situation that Congressman Payne described where we basically sat on our hands while half a million people in Rwanda met a very grim fate indeed, which I think we could have done something about, and not just us, but the international community. That was preventable.

But we were running away from our shadow at that point. And so it led to the notion that somehow it is impossible to have an effective intervention. When, in fact, what was required was adult supervision, not disengagement.

This is very difficult work. And it is not easy to do it well. But there are some people who have done it well.

Mr. Kansteiner. I would agree with that. And I think that perception within the Administration was: We got burned on this one. We are not going to fool with Africa for a while. Hands off.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. A few of the questions and answers revolved around funding priorities and understanding the limited resources that we have and knowing that we would like to have enough funding for all of the programs, knowing that that is no longer reality, what do you believe should be done to reorient our foreign aid priorities in Africa?

Are there some programs receiving money now that you think would be better spent if they had been channeled through another program?
Which ones do you think would have to be reformed or cut in order to provide funds for those areas which you believe should receive higher priority?

Mr. HEMPSTONE. Well, I would say, if I may, Madam Chair, that I think what we want to do is—what we are doing now is staying away from the big showy projects. An example in Kenya is the dam that the French built there which nobody else would touch, which produced—what is that called, David? The dam?

Dr. GORDON. I forget the name of it.

Mr. HEMPSTONE. OK. Both of our memories have gone.

But, anyway, it has produced more controversy than it has power. It cost millions of dollars.

I think the idea of funneling aid through NGO's is a good idea, which we are doing basically in Kenya now, if only because it does reduce the opportunities for corruption.

But I think Aid to Agriculture, which is sort of where AID got started 40 years ago in Africa, is the thing to encourage.

Mr. KANSTEINER. I think one component of aid is how we use it as a lever. Sometimes it is frustrating when you are in the Administration and you see aid programs that are not furthering your policy at all, assuming you have a policy. And, in fact, sometimes they are even contradictory.

And I think it takes a lot of discipline to make sure the specific aid programs and projects that you are pursuing help with your policy, be it in political reform in Kenya or restructuring state assets in Zambia.

Whatever it be, I think you have to look very carefully at specific aid projects and how they affect your goals.

Dr. GORDON. I think one thing that we can do in the post-cold war era is be more selective in the countries that we are engaged in.

I think that we should have a greater threshold of selectivity based on economic performance, on democratization criteria, and human rights criteria. And I think in that way, it can be possible to use aid somewhat more effectively as a lever. And I think that is what Walter is talking about. I think we do not have to show the flag everywhere automatically now in the post-cold war era.

I think we can also focus in on some of the key sectoral issues. I think here things like population and child and maternal health are very important issues. I think improved governance both in the public sector and in the non-governmental sector is very important. Microenterprise is very important. And I think we should be looking for ways. And, again, the pending legislation that Phil Crane, Jim McDermott and Charlie Rangel are working on is looking at how we can better link our aid program to efforts to deepen the trade and the investment linkages between the United States and Africa.

That would be my sense of where we should be going, Madam Chair.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Dr. Crocker.

Mr. CROCKER. Madam Chair, I would just add one point. I think that we should start by recognizing that while our assistance program is serious dollars for anyone who is an elected official in our
country, it really is not a major amount of resources by the standards of the total flow going into Africa.

And, therefore, it is not going to buy us a lot unless we really do target it like you said. And we really do have to do that.

I would cite three priorities: first, helping to strengthen civil society institutions in Africa, to promote the democratization agenda that we have been talking about, free press, rule of law, that area.

Second, conflict resolution, which we made a start on and there was reference earlier to the African Conflict Resolution bill. That is obviously one way to do it, and it is an important start. There are undoubtedly other things that we can do to help transfer capabilities so they become Africanized.

And the third is to help further liberate African economies. Mr. Kansteiner made reference to privatization. One big transaction of the sort that is being discussed today in South Africa, will produce more dollars flowing into Africa than all of our public assistance put together. One transaction. So we need to get the priorities straight here.

Thank you.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.

Congressman Johnston.

Mr. Johnston. Thank you very much.

You know, again, as Ambassador Crocker says, there are some successes: The South African Initiative, Angola, Paul Hare, a career diplomat going in there. Malawi, Ron Brown. So I do not think we should flagellate ourselves so much that we bleed to death here.

When I first got appointed as chairman of the African Subcommittee, the NSC had a breakfast for all the subcommittee chair. And I was not invited. Nothing personal, but I just do not think that Tony Lake knew that there was an African Subcommittee.

Secretary Christopher is going to Addis for conflict resolution to meet with Salim Salim. And from there, he goes to Arusha where the trials are going to be for the war criminals in Rwanda. So there is a presence on this continent by the State Department and a very substantial one.

Ambassador Crocker, No. 4 of your list: Roll up your sleeves in Nigeria and Liberia and Zaire; and you have addressed Zaire. Let me address Liberia.

As a head of the Institute of Peace, you have an audience with the President, the Secretary of State, and the Undersecretary for African Affairs. What do you tell them specifically as to what we should be doing in Liberia?

Mr. Crocker. Congressman Johnston, we, at the Peace Institute, are in regular contact with our colleagues and contacts in the executive branch. We do not regularly get asked by the oval office to come on over and give a briefing.

Mr. Johnston. This is hypothetical.

Mr. Crocker. This is hypothetical.

In Liberia, we are the major player historically. It has been a very difficult transition that was referenced earlier to the experience of the 1980's. We witnessed an election there in the mid 1980's that was not unlike some other rigged and thwarted and stolen elections that have been made reference to. Not a great ex-
The first one they had had for a long time, but not a great experience.

I quite agree that there were opportunities to do more to arrange a soft landing, but that is the past, to get a soft landing out of the Samuel Doe era and into a better era.

But just quite recently, earlier this year, we had a significant amphibious task force off the coast of Liberia which, in my view, had the opportunity, had it actually deployed, instead of engaging in a kind of voyeuristic offshore exercise, could save lives and create a corridor of security and get some disarmament going in the capital city area, particularly where you have the faction fights going on that were leading to lots of deaths every day. And then to try and bridge that kind of a capital city intervention into a strengthening of the ECOMOG force, a reinforcing of the ECOMOG force, and, in effect, a takeover by ECOWAS of the OAU of this process.

It would have entailed some risks. But what is the alternative? The alternative is that Liberia is being raped and pillaged and looted still to this day by criminal business enterprises and illegal firms of all sorts just taking all the natural wealth of the country and people are still dying in large numbers.

Now, there are points in history where you get opportunities. Somebody referred to one earlier, and they have been missed in the past. But I guess what I would have said or what we might have said, and I can only speak personally, Congressman, not for the Institute of Peace, is sometimes you have to take your opportunity.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Good.

Well, Madam Chair, your question about Somalia being a watershed event is, I think, the controlling thing that our State Department took.

October 19, 1993, was the Tet Offensive that killed us there. When CNN showed, ad nauseam, the ranger being dragged through Mogadishu, the white ranger in a black country, I think, to a degree, our policy then became racist. In other words, I heard time and time again my colleagues going on the floor and saying not one American drop of blood should be shed on this continent.

And Secretary Perry sat right there and said: "We are not a Salvation Army," And I said: "You have become catatonic," even to the point where they would not move to release armored personnel carriers to the United Nations to go in there and save these people.

And the irony of it is that when we finally moved to go into Goma, where Congressman Payne went, we sent 2,000 troops in there. I imagine we saved between 50 and 100,000 Rwandans from dying from cholera, and not one American troop was injured, not even a hang nail.

But what happened on that date, you know, we lost 31 troops in 13 months. You lose that many in Fort Hood, Texas, on a maneuver, in the Fourth Armored Division, in the United States; but that just changed our whole policy, when it came to Bosnia, when it came to Haiti, and when it came to Rwanda.

And it would come, I would say, Ambassador Crocker, to sending an attack force into Monrovia tomorrow. We cannot get over that. And until we get over that and we realize that it is cost effective, No. 1; No. 2, anybody who goes into the service today is a volunteer. It is not Vietnam where they were pumping gas 1 day. If you
go into the rangers, you volunteer again to be in combat, see. And you know you are going into combat.

So that is my swan song. And I appreciate your letting me vent all of my frustrations today, Madam Chair.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Harry. Well said.

Congressman Payne.

Mr. Payne. Thank you.

I commend Representative Johnston, who really has become an expert and a very able spokesperson and very courageous.

In the statements that he was making, these statements before, and I concur wholeheartedly with him, there is no question, as a matter of fact as critical as I have been of the French in general, I certainly have to commend them for going into Rwanda with that Operation Turquoise where they prevented two and a half million people from being in harm’s way without losing a single soldier.

I have argued on the McNeil Lehrer show with our U.S. Ambassador Albright and said the study in the United Nations is not working well and all that slaughter is going on. It did not have to happen. Once again, that is in the past.

The other problem that we have in the Liberia situation, as I mentioned, the 1990–1994 totals of commercial activity in Liberia have been primarily—as I compliment the French on one hand for going into Rwanda, on the other hand, most of the commercial business in Liberia, $500 million in timber, in 5 years, $200 million in diamonds, $53 million in rubber, $5 million in gold—have been dealt with primarily by France to Taylor’s people, swapping that for guns.

There has to be some responsibility on the part of western Europe. The same problem in Nigeria with Shell out of the Netherlands, they are looking the other way. No one wants to confront them. And if we do an oil boycott, it does not impact on Europe. England looks the other way.

These problems continue, but they are sort of aided and abetted by the policy of the Europeans and our benign neglect. And I think that somehow some day if we are going to see the continent move toward self-reliance, there has to be some kind of discussion from the part of the West to say that we are not going to continually deal in these economic—I know that sounds very noble. But something has to happen so that we do not continue to supply arms and continue to deal with these thugs as was said earlier. Charles Taylor is just a bunch of thugs. That is all.

I have one other particular problem. You mentioned OPIC. The Senate right now is zeroing out $35 million for NED. I mean, it is trying to see it if can go back in. NED, as you know, has been using the money for democratization.

You know, there is just some sense of craziness going on in this quest to balance the budget—so-called balance the budget, when a program like NED, which has been responsible for a lot of democratization going on, currently has been just wiped out to zero.

Do you have any suggestions of what we could do to try to make the new majority see that some of—a lot of your friends—to see that—maybe, Mr. Crocker, you could suggest—how could we try—what are we doing wrong? What can we do to try to educate our
colleagues in the House and the Senate that these programs, OPIC and the rest of them, are decent?

Mr. CROCKER. Congressman Payne, the best way to get some of my friends, as you put them, to see the light on international programs is to elect Bob Dole President. It would happen quickly.

I do not mean that to be a joke; but that is what would happen. It would lead to some rapid crash courses on the importance of international engagement and funding those functions, I think.

There is a lot of misunderstanding and a lot of just plain ignorance as to what these programs really do. And I must say there needs to be a louder voice from beyond the beltway on some of these issues.

Mr. PAYNE. I just have another quick question in another area.

You know, we still have the situation—and maybe you might take it again, Mr. Crocker—the question of Western Sahara and Morocco. You know we have had a U.N. mandate there, the Moroccans are still not really cooperating. In November the U.N. peacekeepers are supposed to withdraw.

Have you thought about this? And do you have any recommendations that we might do to try to move this thing forward?

Mr. CROCKER. The U.N. force was deployed in a situation of real ambiguity when it first went in, and it has been living with that ever since.

I think the King of Morocco basically feels that he has won the war, the war is over, and that the Western Sahara is his. And the only settlement he is interested in is one that legitimizes that outcome.

And I do not, frankly, see any way we are going to reverse that. Nor am I sure we should try.

So one way to answer you would be to say: Let us find a graceful exit for the United Nations.

Another would be to say: Let us also approach King Hassan and say: Can’t we find a way to sanctify, somehow, the situation and just end it, which would, obviously, include a referendum under some kind of ground rules with the right questions being asked.

I really think this is a conflict that is being kept on by history, and it does not need to be. It is basically over.

Mr. PAYNE. Well, that is unfortunate.

I guess finally, just on the Nigeria situation, as you know, I have legislation that calls for sanctions. Of course, our business people say that unilateral sanctions will hurt our businesses, and other Europeans will continue to move on.

1998 is supposed to be the elections. You know, they keep having these dates. We went to the constitutional convention. Harry Johnston addressed them, I think, up there; and I think the election was going to be held in 1995, then, right?

Mr. JOHNSTON. They promised.

Mr. PAYNE. Promised them in 1995. Moved it to 1996. There was some religious holiday or something.

But, anyone, do you think that this stick—we have had the sort of carrot approach—the United States, there is no question about it, did not want to bother with Nigeria much.

But do you think that this carrot approach—we sent McHenry over there, quietly. We have done everything we can do. At what
point do you think that the Administration ought to say, well, maybe the carrot—you know, they are eating up truck loads of carrots? I mean, is there any time that we end the carrot approach and start to get tough?

Dr. Gordon. As I said, Mr. Payne, it is my strong belief that while it is important to have carrots, they become tasty if there are sticks. And I commend you for working hard to keep those sticks on the agenda.

Mr. Payne. OK. Well, thank you very much. It has been very interesting.

Thank you again, Madam Chairlady.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Congressman Payne.

Mr. Frazer.

Mr. Frazer. Yes, Madam Chair.

I guess we have come to the consensus that there is much to be done as to our policy to those countries on the continent called Africa. So I do not think I will belabor that. We are all aware of it. I guess we will go home and reassess what we have done.

I would just like to commend you for your leadership in the subcommittee. It has been a pleasure working with you and the other members of the subcommittee and for your focus in keeping eyes on the country of Africa as a need to have some kind of constructive and reasonable and thoughtful policy.

So, again, I am sure we will go home from this recess; and we will be back next term trying to improve our relationship and our performance.

So thanks again for your leadership.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Victor. It has been an honor for me. And I think for all of us who have heard the testimony of so many witnesses throughout these 2 years, we have all learned a lot.

Thank you to our panelists today and if I could just take a few moments—I thought that Mr. Johnston could take the remaining moments to brief us on his trip. I do not know how many times he has been in different regions of Africa, but I think he is well known to be a leader in Congress on African issues and he certainly devotes a great deal of his personal time on this effort, and we appreciate his leadership.

We would like to know a little bit about your trip, the leaders you met with, your prognosis for the future and where you think that we have come far with these countries and where there is still much room for improvement.

Thank you, Harry.

Mr. Johnston. Madam Chair, I do not want the panel to be bored. I will be very quick. And if you all get up and leave, I will understand, because you are not here to hear my travel log.

But there were five of us. Lester Munson, down there from the Republican staff, who is a great addition to it, as I told you earlier, any time the four of us would criticize the Republicans, he would defend them and criticize the Democrats. So four to one, we were about even, particularly when you are dealing with someone 6 feet 7 inches tall and weighing 280 pounds.

Congressman Pete Peterson went with us. Then he left from there and went to Moscow and Tajikistan.
And Cliff Kupchan from the full committee and Ted Dagne from the Congressional Research Service. So there were five of us.

We first landed in Nairobi. We used Nairobi as a taking off point. From there we went and flew to Kigali, and I really felt I had to go to Rwanda before I got out of there because we had seven committee meetings on that and discussed it at length and agonized over the genocide during that period of time.

Well, I was instructed by both the State Department and UNHCR to make some suggestions on the controversy on the refugees. There are 1.1 million Hutu refugees that are surrounding this country, either in Tanzania on the East or in Zaire on the West. They are destabilizing three countries—Zaire, Rwanda, and Tanzania—because of the problems that they are having with them. More so in Zaire than in Tanzania.

In Tanzania, we went to a refugee camp there that had 460,000 refugees, spending almost a million dollars a day to feed the refugees. And the United States is paying 80 percent of that. So it is a huge cost.

I came to the conclusion, Madam Chair, rightly or wrongly—I do not profess infallibility, that we need to do something to get the Hutus to move back within Rwanda.

The UNHCR disagrees with me, and I think some of the intelligence communities in the United States disagree with me.

The Hutus are using these refugee camps as a base of operation to have terrorist raids back in Rwanda and to foment really, as I say, destabilizing the area both in western Tanzania and eastern Zaire.

The Zairian army has coalesced with the Hutus to a great degree there, and there is no rule of law in these camps that are there.

If you noticed in yesterday's New York Times, there was a fight between the Hutu army and the Rwandan army across the border there.

I had a press conference in Kigali where I said that we should do four things: We should move the feeding stations in these refugee camps back within the border of Rwanda. It was very caviler to say that. But I added to that that you needed a U.N. security force to protect these people when they move back in, because the Hutus are shooting on their own people. That is their base of operation. They do not want them to go back into Rwanda.

Additionally we need to allow some of these Hutus to go back to their villages to see that there is protection there and there is not this wholesale slaughter of the Hutus by the Tutsis.

There are now probably two and a half to three million Hutus that are already living in the country and are with the Tutsis, relatively safe. And they tell me, the Hutus that we interviewed, say: Well, you are looking at Kigali. The rest of the country is different.

I do not think so. I think right now it is relatively safe if they go back.

Unfortunately the newspapers picked up the fact that I said "We should stop feeding them in the camps and feed them back in Rwanda." The headlines in the papers the next day say: "U.S. Congressman Says Stop Feeding Refugees." And I am the bleeding heart liberal of this committee.
But I do think that for the purposes of stability of these countries, and really for financial reasons, you know, these people have been in these camps now for 2 years, they are being fed on a daily basis, life is good; and I hate to say that, but I think they need to have some push to get them to move back in.

Goma is a lot more serious than the camp that we visited, even though it was a gigantic camp. Why? Because of the military problems that they are having in Zaire and Goma.

We had hoped to get into Burundi, but both the State Department and our ambassador and everybody said we should not. We could have gotten transportation down there, but they said that we really should not go down there because it was so dangerous. And Howard Wolpe, I think, concurred with that.

In Tanzania, we met with the new President, Mkapa, who I think is very good.

The former President, Nyrere is the head of this committee of the surrounding countries, to try to resolve the problem in Burundi. And they have sanctions on Burundi. I think the U.S. State Department agrees with the sanctions but think they are a little too tight, because this does not give Buyoya, the now sitting ad hoc President or President de jure, I guess—that does not give him any latitude or flexibility to negotiate.

But it was a fascinating trip. As I say, I could be dead wrong about the ways to get these people out of there. I visualize these refugee camps as another Gaza strip: 30 years from now, we are still going to be looking at those people in the refugee camps.

We did fly up one morning to southern Sudan to look at a camp there in Nimule that we had seen before. That has been broken down, and it is really now just an in-country refugee camp, and there were 50,000 there when we went to Aswar 3 years ago. There are now only 3,000 in that camp.

CRS, Catholic Relief Service, I think has the right idea. They want to have these people become self-sufficient. They want to give them a hoe and some seed and get out of these camps.

There is a repatriation camp inside of Rwanda where the people come back in. They brief them for 24 to 48 hours. They give them shovels. They give them tin roofs that they can use to build their own houses.

The day we visited, there were 23 people there. In this particular camp in Benaco, last year, there were 34,000 children born. So they seem to be losing at 23 a day coming back and 34,000 being born there. A Malthusian will catch up with them after a while.

That is it, Madam Chair. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Harry, and we will be hearing from you from the private sector this time. We will look forward to having you on the committee as a witness next time.

Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I will never be sworn in.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

And thank you to all the panelists here today. We appreciate it. The subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:47 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
MADAM CHAIR, I AM PLEASED THAT TODAY WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR ASSESSMENTS OF US FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR REMOVED THE OVERARCHING POLICY STRUCTURE THAT DEFINED US EFFORTS IN AFRICA. THE US RIGHTFULLY MOVED FROM SUPPORTING DICTATORS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE ANTI-COMMUNISTS TO AN AGENDA THAT EMPHASIZES DEMOCRATIZATION, ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, AND PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS. TO THIS LIST I THINK WE SHOULD ALSO ADD HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS WHICH HAVE MOVED AMERICANS TO SUPPORT US ENGAGEMENT AND INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA TIME AND AGAIN.

BUT WHILE THESE GOALS REFLECT THE LARGER GLOBAL AGENDA OF THIS ADMINISTRATION, AS WELL AS THE ONE BEFORE IT, US POLICY-MAKERS HAVE YET TO DEVELOP WITHIN THAT GLOBAL FRAMEWORK, A UNIQUE SET OF INTERESTS IN AFRICA. SUCH INTERESTS WOULD HELP CREATE A BROAD-BASED DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCY FOR US ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA AND WOULD HELP MOVE THE DOMESTIC POPULAR VIEW OF AFRICA AS BESET BY CONTINUAL HUMANITARIAN AND NATURAL DISASTERS, TO ONE OF A CONTINENT WITH VAST POTENTIAL.

HAVING SAID THAT, THE ADMINISTRATION’S RECORD IN AFRICA IS NOT WITHOUT SUCCESSES. THE ADMINISTRATION WAS READY WITH A POLICY AND PACKAGE OF ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT THE AMAZING POLITICAL
TRANSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA INITIATIVE TO COORDINATE AID PROGRAMS IN THE HORN TO MOVE COUNTRIES FROM DISASTER ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND BEYOND. SUSTAINED DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN BOTH ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE HAVE KEPT THE PEACE PROCESS IN BOTH COUNTRIES ON TRACK AND THE CURRENT CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN BURUNDI IS HELPING KEEP THAT COUNTRY FROM DESCENDING INTO GENOCIDE.

THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO BEGUN THE INITIATIVE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA WHICH WILL COMPLEMENT OUR BILATERAL PROGRAMS AND PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING REGIONAL PROGRAMS AS WELL AS THE LELAND INITIATIVE, A FIVE-YEAR $15 MILLION PROGRAM TO CONNECT 20 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO THE INTERNET. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS ALSO CONTINUED ITS SUPPORT OF REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS BY PROVIDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION CENTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.

LASTLY, AND I THINK MOST IMPORTANTLY, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WILL TRAVEL TO AFRICA EARLY NEXT MONTH FOR A SERIES OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MEETINGS. I BELIEVE THIS TRIP CAN HELP US IDENTIFY THOSE US INTERESTS UNIQUE TO AFRICA AND RAISE THE PROFILE OF US POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA.

THANK YOU.
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen: It is both an honor and a pleasure to testify on the state of human rights and the expansion of democracy in Africa today.

My name is Smith Hempstone. I am a veteran of 37 years in the newspaper business. Most recently I have served as a foreign correspondent, syndicated columnist, associate editor of the former Washington Star and editor-in-chief of the Washington Times. I have spent more than a third of my working life — about 13 years — in Africa. Most of this time was spent in the East African republic of Kenya, but there is no nation on the continent I have not visited in a professional capacity.

In the summer of 1989, President George Bush named me to be his ambassador to Kenya. I was confirmed by the Senate on November 15, and took up my post in Nairobi on December 1, 1989. As a mark of particular favor, I was kept waiting less than a week before I presented my credentials to President Daniel arap Moi on December 7, 1989.

My appointment had been hailed in Nairobi. Perhaps because I was a political appointee, Moi and the barons of the ruling Kenya African assumed I would have ready access to President Bush. While journalists as a group are no more popular with African politicians than they are with some of their American colleagues, this stigmata
was to a large degree mitigated by the fact that I was known to be conservative, had lived and worked in Kenya before and after independence, knew Moi personally and had at least a working knowledge of Swahili, the country's lingua franca. In short, Moi and KANU I believe thought they were getting a tame ambassador who would accommodate their wishes.

And the truth is that I did not go out to Kenya in 1989 with any notion of unseating Moi or breaking KANU's monopoly of political power. Moi was no Caligula, and there were at the time no known political detainees. A degree of political choice was open to Kenyans within KANU, with a number of the most unpopular parliamentarians being ousted in elections held regularly at five-year intervals since independence in 1963. I thought that most of my time would be devoted to helping Richard Leakey preserve Kenya's dwindling herds of wildlife, assisting in combating the scourge of AIDS, dealing with regional problems in troubled Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia and cementing the alliance which for a decade had placed Kenyan airfields and ports at the disposal of the United States when Washington found itself militarily engaged in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf or the waters of the Indian Ocean.

But on my arrival in Nairobi in 1989, I found that a number of key factors had changed. With the development of U.S. military facilities on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, in the sultanate of Oman and elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula, Kenya had lost much of its importance as a support base. It was convenient to have it, but certainly not necessary. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, for instance, Mombasa had not a single port visit by a U.S. warship. These facilities were, however, used extensively later during the effort to feed Somalia by air.

What's more, the Berlin Wall had come tumbling down by November of 1989. Africans, taking their cue from disgruntled East European demonstrators, were demanding an end to the corruption and misrule that had characterized the 30 years of the post-colonial era. Kenya was not immune to this virus of freedom sweeping across Africa. With a weakened Russia largely out of the game, the Cold War, at least as we had known it for more than four decades, was over.
These altered circumstances created new options for U.S. policy-makers. Washington had three basic choices: it could continue to accept the status quo in Africa (following the lead of the former colonial powers: Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal), it could actively support Moi and other authoritarian rulers, or it could encourage the small but vocal pro-democracy movements that were calling for "a second liberation of Africa." The Bush Administration, correctly in my view, selected the third option.

President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker had on several occasions in 1989 made it clear publicly that the U.S. would reserve its strongest political support and most of its foreign economic assistance for those African nations that stood up for human rights, lived by the rule of law and supported the expansion of democracy. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Henry ("Hank") Cohen had underlined his support of this stance by circulating and praising a Christmas (1989) cable from the U.S. ambassador to Tanzania, Donald K. Patterson, advocating more intimate ties between Washington and those African states that shared our ideals. Just in case some ambassador might not have gotten the word, Cohen in March of 1990 had summoned to Washington all American envoys serving in Africa. At that conference, Cohen made it clear that the U.S. would smile upon those African nations that supported Bush's dictum.

The scales had begun to fall from my eyes within my first three months in Kenya. When I conducted a review of the 1988 Kenyan presidential and parliamentary elections, I found they had been conducted with a degree of chicanery blatant even by African standards. Obvious winners had been declared winners -- the balloting was not secret -- and candidates clearly enjoying only minimal support had been certified as victors. Moi had been reelected unopposed, not by the people but by a conference of 3,000 KANU ward-wheelers. Most protest suits had been disallowed by a compliant judiciary.

There followed the still unsolved brutal murder of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko. Cabinet members, if not Moi himself, obviously had been involved in the killing. The government's cover-up was so transparent it was ludicrous. Against the advice of some members of my staff -- and to Moi's annoyance -- I began developing personal contacts with dissident leaders such as former cabinet ministers.
Charles Njonjo, Kenneth Matiba and Oginga Odinga.

I had told Moi privately what the U.S. expected of its African friends, and he had not been receptive. On May 3, 1990, just five months after my arrival in Nairobi, I went public with a speech to the Nairobi Rotary Club. In it I pointed out that those nations wishing cordial relations with the U.S. (and the generous economic aid that by implication would stem from such relations) would do well to cherish human rights, adhere to the rule of law and expand democracy. On the same day, eight Kenyan dissidents announced the formation of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), a pressure group that demanded early elections, the legalization of multi-party politics and a two-term limit on presidential tenure.

The KANU-owned Kenya Times responded to my speech by advising me to "shut up" and "stop meddling in Kenyan politics." I did neither, of course. I told Moi privately and the press publicly that I reserved the right to meet with whom I wanted and to speak out on events that had an impact on Kenya's relations with the U.S.

The traditional role of an ambassador is as the American President's personal representative to the government of the nation to which he is assigned. This means that almost all of his business is conducted behind closed doors. He seldom spoke to the press and almost never "on the record." The problem was that this "quiet diplomacy" did not work well with leaders like Moi. I decided to use both "quiet" and "public" diplomacy to achieve President Bush's ends. I would speak both to Moi and to the Kenyan people.

My personal Rubicon finally was crossed in June of 1990 when the FORD leaders requested — and were denied — a permit to hold their first public meeting in Nairobi. While the dissident chiefs publicly announced that the meeting would not be held without a permit, the police began picking them up on July 4, some of them fresh from my Fourth of July reception at the American embassy. On Saba Saba, the seventh day of the seventh month (July 7), riot police clashed violently with demonstrators in downtown Nairobi. The security forces fired on the mob and at least 29 people were killed and hundreds of others wounded.
When Gibson Kamau Kuria, a prize-winning human rights lawyer who had been imprisoned and tortured before, took refuge in my embassy during the melee and begged for political asylum, I granted it and informed the State Department after the fact. Moi was furious, but after intensive negotiations Kuria was allowed to leave Kenya for the U.S. a few days later. I publicly condemned the demonstrators for incidents of arson and looting and the police for the brutality with which they had attacked the demonstrators.

Much of the rest of 1990 and 1991 I spent trying to obtain the release of the detained FORU leaders, or at least better treatment of them. Three were imprisoned without charge for nearly a year under harsh conditions and two — Matiba and former Nairobi mayor Charles Rubia — suffered permanent impairment of their health as a result of their ordeal. Meanwhile, the American embassy and its allies — Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Canada and Finland — kept up the pressure on Moi to rescind Article 2(a) of the constitution recognizing KANU as the country's only legal political party. Many other nations supported our stance, but their ambassadors dared not go public lest they be declared persona non grata (Kenya severed relations with Norway when its ambassador dared to attend the trial of a Kenyan resident in Oslo who had been kidnapped by the security police).

For their part, KANU and the Kenyan government stepped up their campaign of vitriol, lies and slander designed to secure my resignation or recall. I was falsely accused of "sneaking around the country" distributing subversive literature (they were in fact self-help school books of blameless banality). I was accused of pushing drugs, funneling money to dissidents and organizing the opposition. At least two threats to my life were reported. Finally, after devoting an entire afternoon to debating my sins, parliament voted unanimously for my recall. At that critical juncture, the White House and the State Department gave me their unqualified support.

Finally, only days after the West in November of 1991 had frozen $350 million of nearly $1 billion in economic aid earmarked for Kenya, Moi got the message and ordered Article 2(A) rescinded. Elections would be held in a year's time and, for the first time in decades, it would be legal for opposition parties to participate. We had won. Or had we?
Having agreed to hold multi-party elections, Moi and KANU used every trick in the book -- and some not there -- to skew the vote in their favor. At least 1 million young Kenyans and possibly many more (out of an electorate of about 10 million) were prevented from going to the polls because the government said there were no cards to register them. Police, soldiers, teachers, health workers and other civil servants were warned to vote for Moi and KANU or lose their jobs. Dissident politicians found their in-country travel curtailed and were denied access to state-owned television and radio stations. Opposition parties -- there were three major ones -- were denied permits to hold rallies and prevented from opening branch offices. Opposition parliamentary candidates were abducted or beaten up to prevent them from filing their papers. Independent journalists were harrassed. More than 1,000 opposition tribesmen lost their lives when 250,000 of them were forced out of their homes in Western Kenya -- where their votes might have made a difference -- back to their tribal homelands. The printing presses worked overtime -- the money supply increased by more than a third within a few weeks -- to fund KANU candidates who already had the active support of the police and the provincial administration.

Finally, as a result of constituency-loading, gerrymandering and the failure of the opposition to back a single presidential candidate or to present a common electoral list of parliamentary candidates, the anti-Moi forces failed to translate their numerical superiority into equivalent political power when voters went to the polls on December 29, 1992.

Nearly two-thirds of all Kenyans voting cast their presidential ballots against Moi. But he was reelected president with 36% of the vote because the other 64% was almost equally divided among three opposition presidential candidates.

While nearly half of Moi's cabinet members were defeated and only about a quarter of the incumbent KANU members of the corrupt 1988 parliament were reelected, the opposition's combined total of nearly 70% of the parliamentary vote was translated into only about 47% (88 out of 188) of the seats at stake. The opposition swept the elections for the largely powerless municipal councils.
President Bush had been defeated for reelection eight weeks before Kenyans went to the polls. My personal sadness at his failure to win a deserved second term, which meant my leaving my job in Kenya half-done, was somewhat lessened by the not unreasonable assumption that a Democratic president would, if anything, take a harder line on African policy. Support for human rights, the rule of law and the expansion of democracy were, after all, Jeffersonian and Wilsonian principles.

This has proved not to be the case. President Bill Clinton has not, to my knowledge, backed away from the application of those principles in Africa. He has simply failed to press his ambassadors and other State Department bureaucrats to pursue such policies. Indeed, one is led to wonder whether the Administration has an African policy. Hand-wringing over dead babies in Burundi does not add up to one.

Kenya is a case in point. In the absence of leadership from either the White House or the State Department, my successor, Aurelia Brazeal, a career diplomat, has been moved to only the mildest of tut-tuts by Moi's most egregiously oppressive acts. One is ashamed to admit that, since 1993, Germany — not the United States — has become and remained the most outspoken advocate of human rights and democracy in Kenya.

The need for such an advocate is obvious. In 1993 alone, 36 opposition members of parliament were arrested, some of them several times. At least three important opposition publications have been firebombed, padlocked or otherwise forced out of business, and all 15,000 copies of a book by Matiba were confiscated by the police. The harassment of independent journalists has continued, and opposition constituencies find it difficult to obtain development funds. In a country in which half the salaried jobs are in the public sector, jobs and promotions continue to go in disproportionate numbers to Moi's tribal cronies. Last year, the world-famous paleontologist Richard Leakey, a double amputee and one of the founders of the opposition Safina (Noah's Ark) movement, was savagely beaten by KANU thugs while the police looked on. No arrests were made, of course, and Safina, one year after its founding, remains unregistered, which prevents it from raising money or recruiting members.
Small wonder that by 1994, opposition leader Paul Muzei could describe Brazeal's embassy as "irrelevant" in the fight for democracy in Kenya. Small wonder that on the occasion of Brazeal's departure from Nairobi the other day, Moi was moved to praise her performance as ambassador. Earlier, one international survey had identified Moi as the world's ninth most oppressive leader; another asserted that Kenya was the globe's third most corrupt nation. Whether Ms. Brazeal's successor, Prudence Bushnell (another career officer), will have the guts to stand up to Moi is anybody's guess.

It must be acknowledged that the "second liberation of Africa" at best has been only a limited success. In 1989, only four of 44 African nations had multi-party political systems. Since then, some 33 of these nations have taken at least their first hesitant steps toward expanding democracy. In five African countries -- Benin, Zambia, Malawi, South Africa and Sierra Leone -- incumbent presidents and their ruling parties have been voted out of office in free and fair elections. But in others such as Kenya, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, authoritarian rulers have clung to power despite strong opposition. In at least two other countries -- Nigeria and Tiger -- the army has intervened to supplant civilian rule.

So the success of the drive begun with such high hopes in 1989 to expand African democracy is by no means assured. While it is only one factor in a complicated equation, these infant democratic movements could well be strangled in their cribs if the international community, led by the American president, does not give them its strong public support. There is little evidence of an understanding of this in the White House today. Perhaps the President's policy-mongers are too busy spinning grim fairy tales about American "successes" in Iraq and Bosnia.

Nobody ever suggested that the evolution of democracy in Africa would be either quick or easy. Modern democracy evolved in Northern Europe at a specific period of history to meet the needs and aspirations of the particular people who lived there. It was shored up by indigenous institutions buttressed by certain shared assumptions. It has prospered most where there is a strong sense of commonweal, a high level of literacy and a decent standard of living.
The historical dice were loaded against the Africans from the start. The continent had come half-baked from the oven of history. Its people had slept through Magna Carta, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Reformation, the American, French and Industrial Revolutions, publication of the Communist Manifesto, the rise of fascism and the development of the H-bomb. Somehow, no one had thought to invent the wheel. Tribal society valued conformity more than innovation, solidarity more than individual action. Dissent frequently was equated with sedition. Leaders demanded — and received — total loyalty and unthinking obedience. Colonial rule, while it took new forms, reinforced this tradition. Nor was time on the side of the Africans.

The haste of the colonial powers' scramble for Africa in the 1880s was matched only by their unseemly hurry — under pressure from the U.S. — to abandon the continent in the 1960s. After a presence of less than a century — no more than a wink in the eye of history (the British were in India for 400 years) — they skedaddled as quickly as they decently could. They left behind the facade of democracy — politically correct constitutions few could understand, strange new flags, unsingable national anthems and inscrutable bewigged judges — but not its substance. Largely absent were such fundamentals of democracy as any notion of checks and balances, the concept of a loyal opposition or a commitment to defend individual or minority rights.

Most African nations began their national lives as multi-party democracies. But the experiment proved short-lived: fastidious men seldom make revolutions and few survive them. The roots of democracy turned out to be shallow, and most African nations have undergone more than one violent change of government in the past 30 years (Nigeria holds the record with six such violent changes). Four African states — Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi — have dis-integrated, or are in the process of doing so. This bloody mayhem has cost the lives of no fewer than two dozen African presidents and prime ministers. Those African leaders who have retired gracefully and voluntarily to the golf course can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Most leave office feet first.
Of the 36 nations with the worst ranking on the United Nations misery index, 24 are African. And the situation is worsening, not improving: GDP per head fell 14% in Africa in the 1980s, and most of the continent's people are worse off than they were when independence was achieved 30 years ago. Literacy rates are among the lowest in the world. Many governments are unable either to attract private investment or to use foreign aid effectively when it is available.

Thus it is hardly surprising that democracy has not thrived in Africa. What is surprising is that after 30 years of poverty, corruption, misrule and oppression, a constituency for democracy still exists in most African nations.

These pro-democracy forces nowhere constitute a majority. They tend to be small, educated urban elites with access to television (not available outside of the biggest cities) and personal ties to the West. The problem is that these urban elite minorities, literate and moneyed, live cheek by jowl with rural majorities that are tribal, poverty-stricken, semi-literate and only slowly emerging from the Bronze Age. To most of these unfortunate people, democracy is a concept that is both alien and risible. The best most of them can expect from their governments are policies of benign neglect.

Since African politics is a zero-sum game, one can rely on entrenched authoritarian elites such as Moi's kleptocracy to fight bitterly and to the end to preserve their power, prestige and lives. The record is one of squandered foreign aid, wasted human resources and dashed hopes. It is easy to be pessimistic.

Indeed, there are those in the West who maintain it is none of our business whether democracy succeeds or fails in Africa, that the U.S. has no vital interest in the fate of the continent. On the contrary, I would argue that, if America is to remain true to its ideals -- and we must do so for our own sake -- we must support freedom and oppose tyranny wherever they exist in the world. Certain it is that if we do not, no one else will.

Further, I would argue that the national security of the U.S. is directly affected by the level of human rights and democracy around the world. It is precisely those rogue nations that deny such rights -- Iraq, Iran and Libya are examples -- that pose a threat to our peace and prosperity.
To suggest that democracy never can work in Africa surely must contain an element of racism. Its success in nations as disparate as Costa Rica, Japan and Italy would seem to suggest its global applicability.

Part of the American difficulty in following through on a policy of support for opposition democratic movements in Africa can be attributed to the inherent inertia and accommodationist culture of the State Department. Despite the personal support of President Bush and Secretary Baker for the expansion of democracy in Africa, despite Cohen's endorsement of the Patterson telegram, despite the Washington conference of American envoys to Africa, not all 40 of the career ambassadors or the four political appointees returned to their posts determined to implement this policy.

The probable reason is not far to seek. Few people get to be ambassadors — perhaps 150 around the world — and fewer still are appointed to a second embassy. Career officers have learned from experience that whistle-blowers do not prosper in the State Department any more than they do in the military. You go along and you get along. No matter what the President or the Secretary of State may say, for an ambassador to get too much ink in the press, to get a little too far out in front, can be dangerous. It can invite the antipathy of a powerful congressman, the opposition of vested interests or the envy of influential bureaucrats. A policy that is not vigorously articulated and followed up upon is one that may fade away and be forgotten. Civil servants seldom are censured for inaction, and it is safer to do little or nothing. Certainly a little diplomatic lassitude will make for better relations with your host government. After all, the trains do have to run on time.

At the end of the day, the game in Africa is worth the candle. The task of expanding democracy, of course, is the basic responsibility of the Africans. But the U.S. can and should help. The important thing is to make our policy simple and clear, and to stick with it. Support for freedom may lose us some sunshine friends. But we will gain new and more seemly ones to replace them.

Thank you again for giving me the opportunity to share my thoughts with you. I am ready now to answer any questions you may have.

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"Assessing the Clinton Administration's Africa Policy"

Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee
Subcommittee on Africa

September 26, 1996

David F. Gordon
Overseas Development Council

I would like to thank the Subcommittee Chair, Representative Ros-Lehtinen, and members of the Committee for inviting me to testify on the topic of the Clinton Administration's performance in Africa. This is an important topic and I commend the Chair for calling this hearing today. I am particularly pleased to be sharing the table with Ambassador Hempstone with whom I had the great privilege to serve when he was U.S. Ambassador to Kenya. I also want to commend the Chair, the Ranking Member, Mr. Ackerman, and other members of the Committee for the diligent work of their very talented and hard-working staffs.

The views that I express this afternoon are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my colleagues at the Overseas Development Council or its Board of Directors.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF U.S. AFRICA POLICY

In a recent issue of the journal Foreign Policy, as an exception to his generally favorable assessment of the Clinton Administration's conduct of foreign affairs, Richard Ullman, a relatively liberal analyst, gave the Administration a failing grade for its Africa policy, with the tart comment: "No Cold War = No Policy." This afternoon, my colleagues around this table, none of whom will take umbrage at the label conservative, are presenting their own critical comments concerning the Clinton Administration's Africa policy. So, the Administration's Africa policy has come under criticism from both sides of the spectrum.
I believe that, while not without weaknesses, the Administration's performance in Africa has been basically sound. Before moving on to the details of my assessment, let me comment briefly on the context within which U.S. Africa policy operates. Several elements of the political context have been major determinants of that policy.

First, is the peculiar limbo status of Africa in post-Cold War foreign policy. Stuck between ill-defined, but real, American interests and Africa's peripherality to U.S. strategic or vital concerns, Africa policy is inherently very tricky. Absent the Cold War framework where all regions were part of the chessboard of the great game of superpower competition, determination of U.S. interests for several regions has been under dispute, but nowhere has this been more difficult than in Africa.

In this context, continuing U.S. engagement in Africa has often been justified by an ever-expanding litany of "new" issues and threats that demand immediate American attention. Approaches to Africa by advocates of many political stripes tend to veer among absolutes -- either complete handwashing, domination by a single theme (be it the environment, democracy, or trade promotion), or massive overextension. The Administration has been generally successful in balancing disparate views and moderating extreme pressures from all camps.

Second, the Administration has been inundated with immediate crises and disasters in Africa. Assistant Secretary Moose has expressed, on several occasions, frustration at his inability to focus on the larger goals of U.S. policy because of the day-to-day crush of responding to Africa's multiple crises. The proliferation of crises has complicated efforts to articulate and implement broader conceptual themes for policy. Hopefully, Secretary Christopher's impending trip to Africa will help address this issue.

Third, anti-internationalism in general and anti-Africa sentiment in particular has reared its head in the Congress. In the aftermath of the loss of U.S. lives on the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993, and especially after the 1994 election, U.S. Africa policy has been under something of a "state of siege." Somalia was a watershed in encouraging congressional and public hostility toward the UN and toward active U.S. engagement in Africa. A barrage of anti-internationalist pressures from the public and Congress, specific calls from Senators Helms and McConnell to substantially cut U.S. assistance to Africa, and large cuts in the international affairs budget have left Africa policy-makers on the defensive, scrambling to justify continued American involvement and to find the resources needed to support that engagement.

Despite this very challenging political context, on the whole the Clinton Administration record on Africa is positive. Moreover, in Africa policy, as in other areas of foreign policy, the Administration is settling onto a more steady tack after some initial rough waters.

* The Administration worked effectively for change in South Africa, supporting the long negotiating process, providing an ample aid package for the transition period, and
working to build a broad relationship with the new South Africa based on the principle of mutual benefit and respect.

* It played a crucial role in reinvigorating the peace process in Angola, where we now stand on the verge of a decisive breakthrough that holds the promise of ending Africa’s longest war.

* It has increased pressure on the terrorist-supporting Islamic fundamentalist regime in Sudan.

* It has provided strong international leadership on humanitarian relief, especially in the Horn of Africa, and has been in the driver’s seat on multilateral efforts to promote Africa’s own capacities for conflict resolution and peacekeeping.

* It has utilized new policy instruments to foster improved human rights, the consolidation of democracy, and more effective governance.

* Finally, the Administration has made Africa a priority within the U.S. foreign aid program, protecting the African account from the draconian cuts taken from programs to Asia and Latin America.

The Administration has been somewhat less successful in some other areas:

* It has had difficulty in generating consensus and action in response to the derailing of the democratic transition in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous state.

* Chastened by Somalia and allowing its skepticism towards the UN and Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to overcome fundamental humanitarian considerations, the U.S. (as well as other countries) failed to take preventive action that might have mitigated the tragedy in Rwanda in 1994.

* While successfully defending bilateral aid, the Administration has been less successful in defending the U.S. contribution to the International Development Association, the soft-loan window of the World Bank, nearly one-half of whose resources are lent to Africa.

AFRICA POLICY: THEMES AND IMPLEMENTATION

Support for democratization, facilitation of conflict resolution, and promotion of economic reform and sustainable development, comprise the tripod of the Clinton Administration’s Africa policy. These themes reflect the essential continuity of U.S. Africa policy in the post-Cold War era. The Clinton Administration has built upon efforts begun in the Bush Administration to shift U.S. Africa policy away from the negative elements of the Cold War legacy toward more
positive ends. It is unfortunate that the bi-partisan continuity in U.S. policy towards Africa has not been better recognized since it is a positive sign of consensus in U.S. foreign policy.

The U.S. has stopped supporting dictators and military regimes in Africa. Instead, there has been a substantial shift in American aid and attention toward countries undertaking transitions to more open political systems and freer economies. In the 1980s, much U.S. aid was wasted in Mobutu’s Zaire, Sergeant Doe’s Liberia, and Siad Barre’s Somalia. But today, U.S. aid resources are directed to those African countries most dedicated to reform and with the best prospects for trade and investment. Among our leading recipients are South Africa, Uganda, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Mali all of which are all going through difficult “dual transitions” to democracy and a market economy.

U.S. aid is playing an important role in facilitating the return to economic growth and stability that is occurring in most African countries. Our assistance promotes development by facilitating better economic policies, helping to entrench democratic governance and supporting basic human resource investments in child survival and girls education. Partially as a result of these efforts, most African countries have growth rates of over three percent per year and U.S. exports to Africa have been growing at a rate of more than twenty percent annually for the last two years.

Taking into account the inherent difficulties involved in promoting democracy in Africa, the Clinton Administration’s record is strong. As one of Africa’s most astute observers, Professor Ali Mazrui, noted in testimony before this Subcommittee, “the U.S. must recognize the paradox of a strong African desire for democracy combined with a fragile African capability for it.” An oft-heard critique, from democracy advocates and some human rights groups, is that the Administration has failed to live up to the promises concerning democratization made in the 1992 presidential campaign. But, the fact that the Administration has not made democracy promotion the be-all and end-all of its Africa policy is a sign of flexibility and maturity rather than failure.

The Administration has signaled U.S. support for democratization by increasing aid programs in new democracies and closing down programs in countries like Cameroon and Togo, where autocrats hijacked democratic transitions. U.S. support, through training and monitoring, has been crucial in the success of “transitional elections” in nearly twenty African countries. The U.S. has played an important role in all of Southern Africa’s democratic transitions and, as a result, has an influence in the region far in excess of the still limited formal U.S. presence and economic ties. This influence is already paying dividends for the United States. In the debate on the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, South Africa lent its considerable moral stature to the U.S. effort to achieve an extension of the Treaty, and was a significant factor in our success.

The Administration has also worked to advance conflict-resolution and conflict-prevention activities in Africa. Working with members of this Committee from both parties, the Administration supported, and helped shape, the Africa Conflict Resolution Act of 1994. It has
supported the efforts of the Organization of African Unity to build an indigenous capacity for conflict resolution, and is now undertaking an intense effort, along with a number of European states, to develop a strategy for enhancing the military capacity of African peacekeeping forces.

Again working with a bipartisan group of members of Congress, the Administration is currently developing a more coordinated approach to facilitating U.S. trade and investment in Africa. The U.S. has played a significant role in promoting economic reform in Africa, and has an interest in maximizing the impact of those reforms on U.S. trade and investment. The Administration has been in intense consultations with the Africa Trade and Investment Caucus, led by Representatives Phil Crane and Jim McDermott, on a set of legislative and executive branch initiatives.

GUIDEPOSTS FOR THE FUTURE: U.S. INTERESTS

Madam Chair, you asked the panelists today for suggestions on how the U.S. should approach various issues affecting the African continent. In looking at future U.S. engagement in Africa, it is useful to begin by laying out U.S. interests. Here we must distinguish among actual threats to national security, significant national interests, and mere aspirations. Any headlong analysis of Africa must conclude that, with the exception of Sudan’s ties to international terrorist organizations, U.S. security concerns in Africa are marginal by any measure. But America does have real interests in Africa.

First and foremost is a humanitarian interest. Fifty years ago, in announcing post-World War II reconstruction plans, Secretary of State George Marshall committed U.S. foreign policy to a fight “against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.” The geographical focus of that fight shifted over the years, from Europe in the late 1940s, to Latin America, and then to Asia. Today, the focal point for America’s spirit of generosity must be Africa. Although famine and the dire crises Americans readily associate with Africa are in fact rare, Africa remains the world’s poorest, least educated, and least healthy continent. Recent polls suggest that public support is strongest for American aid and intervention abroad for humanitarian reasons.

We also have economic interests in Africa. Despite the low level of existing commerce, Africa remains a huge potential untapped market for U.S. trade and investment. Economic opportunities in Africa have improved dramatically in the past several years. The ideological climate in Africa has shifted to a remarkable degree with almost every country at least moving in the right direction of economic reform. Africa boasts more than a dozen active stock markets (with at least five more in the works) and many countries have liberalized their investment codes and begun to attract substantial investment, most notably Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Uganda.

In 1995, U.S. exports to Africa increased by over twenty percent, and recently released Commerce Department figures show that this expansion has continued in the first half of this year. South Africa, because of its sheer economic size and regional domination, is already an important economic partner. On the investment side, numerous Africa-related funds, touting the
continent as the "final frontier", have sprung up in some of the world's biggest investment houses, including Morgan Stanley, Baring Brothers, and Alliance Capital. We need to keep in mind that it was not so long ago that countries in Latin America and Asia that are now lucrative markets for U.S. trade and investment were considered hopeless, much of the way that Africa is perceived today.

Several transnational issues directly affect the United States and can only be adequately addressed through bilateral and multilateral cooperation with African partners. The lesson from the battle against smallpox and AIDS is that global efforts are necessary to wipe out some public health threats. International drug trafficking and crime syndicates are a rising problem that can only effectively be dealt with through cooperative efforts. The U.S. also has a substantial interest in preventing the further expansion of drug and crime networks in Africa.

Finally, the African-American community wants the U.S. to be engaged in Africa. The end of the Cold War has made regional and issue-specific constituencies increasingly influential in U.S. foreign policy. Such ethnic influence in foreign policy has a long history in American politics and is certainly well within the American tradition. A successful foreign policy must reflect and incorporate the views, values, and concerns of all segments of American society.

PROMOTING U.S. INTERESTS: SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM APPROACHES

During the Cold War, the central policy debate concerning Africa was between those who favored a short-term approach based on Cold War calculations and those who proposed a long-term strategy based on fostering more rapid economic growth and development. In 1987, Congress put its weight decisively behind the latter approach by creating the Development Fund for Africa (DFA). But, as long as the Cold War continued, a long-term approach based on the development paradigm could never prevail.

In the past few years a new, and largely unaddressed, tension has emerged between long-term and short-term involvement. On the one hand, the underlying logic of the DFA legislation remains valid. Encouraging and supporting "development" -- social, political, and especially economic -- is the basic long-term strategy for attaining many, indeed most, of the United States' goals in Africa. On the other hand, events on the ground in Africa and political pressures at home have pushed U.S. Africa policy into a much more short-term mode. To some extent, this is unavoidable and appropriate. Yet, the increasing pressures for immediate response, combined with the insistence by NGOs and many in the Congress that U.S. development assistance efforts focus on child-survival and other immediate social expenditures, threaten to take the U.S. "out of the game" of long-term development. We need to restore a balance between short-term and long-term approaches in order to effectively promote U.S. interests in Africa.
A: The Short-Term: Criteria for Crisis Intervention

For many African countries, it clearly makes little sense to think long-term as they face political, economic, or social crises. The U.S. clearly has a role in these situations in providing humanitarian and emergency assistance, but the question is how can the U.S. decide where and when to act, beyond emergency relief, in crisis or potential-crisis situations? The cold realities are that in most instances the U.S. will not be able to successfully engage or intervene. But there are a number of cases where the U.S. will not be able, and should not, disengage. What specific criteria justifies intervention?

* The first is large states that hold the key to regional stability. This would only include a few countries, most notably Nigeria and Zaire (as well as Kenya and South Africa, should a major crisis arise). While the disintegration of the Togolese state would be a tragedy for Togo, it would have no regional implications and pressure for external assistance would fall into the lap of the intimately engaged French. But the collapse of Nigeria into chaos or civil war would likely have regional repercussions that could unleash waves of instability and mass migration throughout West Africa.

* Second, are countries where the U.S. has significant economic interests. Again, this would involve only a very limited number of countries with Angola and Nigeria being the two obvious cases due to the vast quantities of oil we import from them. The United States annually purchases over $5 billion of Nigerian oil and $2 billion from Angola. Major American companies, including Mobil, Chevron, Exxon, and Texaco, have significant production and exploration interests in those two countries with total U.S. private investment topping $6 billion.

* Third, are countries with close historic ties to the United States, in which there is a broad consensus within the international community and in Africa that the U.S. is the relevant dominant external power. Only Liberia and Ethiopia fall into this category. Decisive American engagement in Ethiopia in 1991 was crucial in facilitating the stable political transition following that country’s civil war. Unfortunately, the failure of the U.S. to take decisive action at several key moments has been one reason why the Liberian conflict has been so difficult to end.

* Finally, given the American humanitarian tradition, the U.S. should not ignore crises where, barring international action, large numbers of people face imminent death. While the defining lines would necessarily be fuzzy, in instances of impending mass starvation (Somalia in 1992) or genocide (Rwanda in 1994 and Burundi today), policymakers should be prepared for such contingencies. Simply reacting to emotional public outbursts is no basis for policy. It must be recognized that massive intervention can be dangerous, costly, and fraught with unforeseen complications. But, despite the risks, there will sometimes be no alternative to intervention.
In countries that fall within one of these four categories, the U.S. must be willing to undertake serious diplomatic efforts and to commit both real resources and/or impose real costs in order to invigorate such diplomacy. In this regard, often the U.S. will need to work with other major powers and shape and support United Nations initiatives.

B: The Long-Term: Focused Support for Development

Successful development will be the long-term key for preventing crises, addressing humanitarian concerns, and taking advantage of economic opportunities. While most of the important challenges and problems facing Africa -- managing ethnic diversity, controlling the population explosion, creating effective and stable polities, promoting higher rates of economic growth -- do not threaten the U.S. directly, there will be costs to the United States should they fail to be successfully addressed. In that context, the interests that the United States does have in Africa -- avoiding human suffering and the need for large-scale emergency relief, developing markets for American products, addressing global health, drug, and crime problems, preventing breeding grounds for international terrorism -- will be much harder, and probably impossible, to achieve.

The good news is that the prospects for development in Africa, and the ability of international assistance to facilitate development, have never been better. A number of long-standing conflicts have been resolved, misguided experiments with socialism have been abandoned, and a new generation of highly competent political and economic managers now occupy senior roles in most countries. Some twenty-five Africa countries are moving forward, if in many cases slowly, on economic reform and democratization and/or national reconciliation.

Moreover, within Africa a broad consensus has emerged on a strategy for development that is consistent with U.S. interests. This strategy emphasizes the following themes: first, the importance of effective macro-economic management; second, the need to promote the market and private sector as the engine of economic growth; third, the centrality of sustainable investment in basic education and health; fourth, the continuing need to reduce the rate of population growth; and fifth, the importance of strengthening the institutional underpinnings for development, both within the government and in the non-governmental sectors. At the center of the new consensus is the belief that while external assistance can be helpful, the primary impetus for development can only come from within.

How can the United States best support this agenda?

First, by continuing to support the International Development Association (IDA), the soft-loan window of the World Bank. IDA resources remain central to both the on-going process of economic policy reform and to the vast bulk of major investment activities ranging from human resource development through improved basic health and education, the expansion of the financial systems, and the rehabilitation and construction of basic infrastructure needed for economic growth.
Second, by ensuring that as African countries recover economically and begin to increase their exports, they do not run into restrictive trade barriers. Particularly problematic are the rules of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, in which a percentage increase in a country's exports to the U.S. within each category of textile goods automatically triggers a quota response. African countries are starting from such a low base that even modest success can provoke such a quota, as the U.S. recently slapped on Kenyan textile exports. Although such incidents are rare and relatively minor today, as Africa grows, these barriers may become more onerous in the future.

Third, by better concentrating bilateral assistance both substantially and geographically. American bilateral programs should be concentrated in those countries showing strong commitments to private sector-based development, effective human resource investments, improved governance, liberalization of their political sphere, and respect for international human rights norms.

Substantively, U.S. assistance programs should focus on key areas in which the U.S. has a comparative advantage, which are high priorities within the African development consensus, and which will serve to create a broader range of economic linkages between the U.S. and Africa. Existing U.S. aid programs are spread too thin and in some ways lag behind the current African consensus. They often pay too little attention to the opportunities that exist for promoting expanded trade and investment ties between the U.S. and Africa, and are increasingly looking away from programs aimed at improving governmental performance.

A reformed U.S. bilateral aid program in Africa should focus in four areas: first, reducing population growth rates through provision of family planning services and better child and maternal health care; second, improving governance by strengthening the capacity of African governments and enhancing non-governmental voices; third, promoting more dynamic microenterprise development to unleash the latent talents of Africa's hidden entrepreneurs and create expanded employment opportunities; and fourth, developing an African trade and investment partnership that will both provide a stimulus for economic growth in Africa and deepen the trade linkages between U.S. firms and 600 million potential consumers of American goods in Africa.

Given the crisis-ridden political context within which it has had to operate, the Clinton team's overall record in Africa is positive. By emphasizing the areas that I have highlighted, the next Administration, whether led by President Clinton or Senator Dole, can do even a better job of focusing policy in more deliberate ways and best serve U.S. interests in Africa into the next century.
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"House Committee on International Relations"

In the past 10 years, U.S. policy towards Africa has focused on a few core issues - conflict resolution, political reform, and economic and commercial development being the dominant concerns. The Clinton Administration has not differed from previous administrations. It too has articulated its policies based upon these three central issues. Resolving conflict, encouraging democratic political institutions and building a strong economy are interlinked, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. This testimony is a very brief attempt at examining the Administration's policies and performance on economic and commercial issues.

After a somewhat slow start, the Clinton Administration realized that Africa has commercial potential. With U.S.-Africa trade increasing and direct foreign investment growing substantially, the Administration began searching for ways to promote U.S.-Africa commercial activity. Last year trade with Africa grew 12% to $18 billion. U.S. exports to Africa were about on the same level as our exports to Eastern Europe.

Direct equity investment has also been expanding. U.S. companies now have as much invested in South Africa alone, as they have in Turkey, Israel, or India. (It is interesting to note that the average return on investment in African holdings is 28% - far higher than the 8.5% worldwide average).
These impressive economic statistics helped encourage the Clinton Administration to organize a White House Conference on Africa in June 1994. The message from this conference was on target as senior officials discussed the importance of supporting a strong private-sector throughout Africa. And U.S. corporations were encouraged to seek out African trading partners, and to look for investment opportunities.

The conference, however, was followed by very little concrete support, but for one important exception, the late Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown. In his three years in office Ron Brown averaged two trips per year to Africa. He led commercial missions, he pushed for greater trade, he encouraged U.S. companies to invest in Africa. But most importantly he diplomatically but forcefully explained to African leaders that they had to get their economic houses in order if they wanted to succeed in attracting investment dollars. Ron Brown’s voice was heard, and he helped both the African states as well as American companies.

Unfortunately, since his death, the Commerce Department does not seem to have the same level of interest or energy in pursuing his initiatives.

The Clinton Administration has also attempted to encourage business contacts with programs such as the U.S.-South Africa Binational Commission, which has a business council component.

These limited efforts at supporting commercial activity between the U.S. and Africa have been quite helpful. But the next administration, whether Democrat or Republican, should begin to consider how the U.S. can influence, persuade, cajole, and push African states towards more
aggressive free market economic policies. The U.S. voice in Africa carries far, and we need to demonstrate our commitment to a strong private sector throughout the continent. African governments have long-dominated their own economies and their country’s commercial activity. But if Africa is to prosper, governments must give up the reins of economic power and release the private sector from excessive regulations and restrictions.

Privatizing state-owned companies is an important first step in taking governments out of critical commercial sectors. Often, African political leaders are reluctant to carry-out privatization programs. But privatization of state assets is the most efficient way of transforming equity structures and making these companies preform on a commercial basis. The U.S. government must support privatization efforts, bilaterally, as well as through the international financial institutions like the World Bank, IMF and African Development Bank.

The next Administration must also focus on the region’s most likely economic success story - southern Africa. Along with the rest of the world, the current Administration has thoroughly enjoyed the success of Nelson Mandela’s new South African government. But the honeymoon is over, South Africa and the southern African region must make some tough economic decisions. Southern Africa has a population of about 125 million; it is a region that has excellent resources and commercial infrastructure. It could develop internal trading patterns that would benefit all of the countries in the region. What is desperately needed is some type of free-trade agreement or structure. The U.S. government should be actively encouraging the regions political and commercial leaders in discussing and building plans for a Southern Africa Free Trade Zone. Perhaps the nucleus institutions already exist with the South African Customs Union and SADC
(Southern African Development Community). But the next administration could assist in building an African economic institution that would have long-term commercial benefits.

The next administration needs to continue the hands-on type commercial activity that Ron Brown actively pursued. But it also must become engaged in helping African countries take the right steps toward building private-sector dominated economies. Our active participation in privatization processes, either bilaterally or via international financial institutions, is critical. We must also become involved in helping Africans formulated economic strategies that appear overwhelming, like a Southern African Free Trade Zone, yet are absolutely necessary if Africa is to become economically viable in the next century.